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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
1.       Under central planning, the Russian city, positioned at the bottom of the government 
hierarchy, performed a variety of functions, some “municipal” and others related to the 
production sector, all dictated by higher levels of government and planning authority. The 
various city institutions were run Soviet-style and lacked real independence. Under transition 
following the disintegration of the USSR, however, cities have become centers of change.  
First, the creation of a market economy calls for a service infrastructure that is largely an 
urban phenomenon. This is especially true in Russia and other FSU republics, where changes 
in agriculture have taken place more slowly than in other centrally planned economies. 
Second, decentralization of government powers and functions has left the cities increasingly 
more independent of Moscow and even of the governments of the regions 
(oblast/republic/kray) in which they are located.   This is reflected in the evolution of the city 
budget and in the increasing level of independence in budget execution.  And third, 
privatization of old firms and the establishment of new private firms have transformed the 
relationship between government and the productive sector, which is increasingly privately 
owned.  
2.       As cities have become centers of change, they have become increasingly 
differentiated from their surrounding rural hinterlands.  Figure 1, admittedly somewhat dated 
but encompassing the most recent statistics, illustrates the increasing divergence between the 
Volga capitals and their surrounding regions using three economic indicators—average 
monthly wages, per capita retail trade, and private car ownership per thousand residents. In 
1985, there was little difference on average between city and countryside, with the exception 
of retail trade (some 15 percent higher in the cities).  Between 1990 and 1997, however, there 
was a dramatic improvement in the relative position of most cities.
3  As a result of these 
growing differences, it becomes increasingly important to study urban and rural areas 
separately, rather than jointly as is typical in regional-level analysis. 
3.       Such a task, however, is complicated by scarcity of data at the city level.  No detailed 
national statistics for cities have been published since the appearance in 1994 of 
Socioeconomic Statistics of Capitals of Republics, Krays, and Oblasts of the Russian 
Federation (Goskomstat Rossii, 1994). However, some information on Russia’s major cities 
can be obtained from two more recently published statistical compendia (Regiony Rossii) on 
Russia’s regions (Goskomstat Rossii, 1997a, 1998a).
4  In addition to the problems of data 
scarcity, the standard caveats regarding problems surrounding the reliability of data apply 
                                                 
3 Samara is the only city that consistently lags behind its surrounding region on these 
indicators. This reflects the fact that the values for the remainder of Samara Oblast are 
elevated by the inclusion of Togliatti, a major industrial city in the region.  
4  In addition to these regional volumes, Bradshaw and Hanson (1998) provide a useful 
review of the English-language literature on political, economic, and social transition in the 
Russian regions.   - 4 - 
here as well.   We acknowledge, for example, such difficulties as problematic price deflators 
and alternative values for the same variable appearing in different sources.  The paper reflects 
a best-effort approach, and we occasionally call attention to specific data problems. 
 
Table 1. Comparison of Volga Capital Cities to Rest of Region 
Source: Goskomstat, Cities of Russian Federation, 1995, Goskomstat, Regionyi Rossii, Vol.1 and Vol.2, 1997, 
Goskomstat, Regionyi Rossii, Vol.1 and Vol.2, 1998, city case studies and city statistical bulletins. 
 
a/ Per capita volume of retail trade of consumer goods and services. 
b/ Automobile possession per 1000 residents. 
 
 
4.       This paper focuses on the course of transition in 10 cities
5 serving as capitals of 
regions situated along the Volga River (see Figure 1), a broad region that sometimes has been 
described as the “heartland” of Russia and the former USSR (e.g.,Hooson, 1960, 1964). Two 
of the regions are republics (Tatarstan and Chuvashia); the other eight are oblasts. A 
comparison is of interest since historical access to similar information, technology, and 
cultural influences suggests that there would be less diversity in the experience of these cities 
than cities varying more widely in terms of size or more widely dispersed across the Russian 
Federation.  
 
                                                 
5The 10 cities include Tver’, Yaroslavl’, Nizhniy Novgorod, Cheboksary, Kazan’, 
Ul’yanovsk, Samara, Saratov, Volgograd, and Astrakhan’.The Volga River has been a north-
south trade route for many centuries, and there is substantial similarity among the cities.  All 
are old cities with deep historical and cultural roots, with several being founded in the 10th 
(Yaroslavl’), 12th  (Tver’), and 13th (Nizhniy Novgorod) centuries.  The cities range in 
population from approximately 450,000 (Tver’ and Cheboksary) to 1.4 million (Nizhniy 
Novgorod), typically accounting for roughly one-third of their regions’ total population.   
Ratio of Capital City to Rest of Region x 100
Average Monthly Wages Retail Trade a/ Automobile Possession b/
1985 1992 1996 1997 1985 1992 1996 1997 1985 1992 1995
Tver 101 128 136 102 128 71 92 163 141 155 198
Yaroslavl 99 123 139 142 117 63 180 227 123 129 149
Nizhni Novgorod 104 108 117 119 138 68 140 132 102 112 N/A
Chuvashia 116 134 142 154 116 78 95 99 90 139 N/A
Tatarstan 102 86 87 101 122 53 151 195 78 100 111
Ulyanovsk 107 116 125 122 128 58 173 189 90 128 N/A
Samara 100 82 87 97 117 51 96 112 88 96 N/A
Saratov 102 95 116 128 146 66 213 222 96 104 124
Volgograd 104 98 130 135 142 49 109 145 81 77 78
Astrakhan 95 92 122 111 137 60 251 243 99 139 N/A
RegionFigure1. Regional Capitals Along the Volga River  - 6 - 
5.       We employ two basic approaches in the study of transition in these cities, each 
approach corresponding to a major part of the paper.  In the first part, we explore in some 
detail the problems encountered by Russian cities in the two aspects of transition--city as 
government and city as an economic center—with the focus placed on the common 
experience of the 10 capitals.   In our effort to understand this common experience, we draw 
on a variety of sources, including fiscal data distinguishing revenue and expenditure patterns 
of cities from those of their surrounding regions and a small survey of the business 
environment and transaction costs in 6 of the 10 cities. In the second part, we examine the 
evolution of differences among the cities, demonstrating how more or less uniform economic 
conditions diverged early in the transition period and outlining several hypotheses regarding 
how such differences arose.  This portion of the study, which uses conditions in 1990 as a 
benchmark against which to measure change, relies on a variety of local and federal 
government statistical publications, newspaper articles, and Russian and international 
scholarly work, in both published and unpublished form. 
6.       The impetus for transition at the city level has been partly legislative, with the two 
most relevant laws in Russia being the 1995 “Law on Organization of Local Self-
Government” and the 1997 “Law on the Financial Foundations of Local Government in the 
Russian Federation.”
6 Although most of the power at the sub-national level still resides with 
regional governments, these laws have given more independence to large urban 
agglomerations such as capital cities, where elected officials now have a local power base.
7  
The extent of privatization, price controls, support for new private firms, mobilization of 
local revenues, and disposition of available budgetary funds all at least partly depend on local 
leadership.  And in the Volga region, local leadership tends to be more progressive than 
leadership at the regional level. 
7.       The following section of the paper presents a stylized view of the evolving nature and 
functions of the city during transition from a Soviet-type city to a modern market, or 
Western-style, city.  We then document and analyze the expanding fiscal role of cities, 
exploring and attempting to explain variations in the patterns of fiscal decentralization.  The 
focus is on the structure of city revenues and expenditures within the Volga capitals, with 
particular attention devoted to the most distinctive aspect of their budgets—the large share of 
expenditures on housing and utilities and the lack of any significant contribution of property 
taxes to revenues.  A subsequent section of the paper draws on a recent survey and other city-
level economic data to characterize the current features of the urban economy in the Volga 
capitals, and the relationship between local government and the private sector.  Then, in the 
                                                 
6 The effects of these laws can vary, as the “Law on Organization of Local Self-Government” 
provides for the relationship between regions and municipalities to be defined separately for 
each “federation subject.” 
7 Since 1996 mayors and city councils are freely elected throughout the Russian Federation.  
See de Melo and Ofer 1999 for a discussion of the political landscape in the 10 Volga regions 
and regional capitals.    - 7 - 
second major part of the paper, we shift the focus to exploring differences (rather than 
common experiences) among the 10 cities, in an effort to explain their divergent economic 
fortunes over the period of transition. 
II.   THE  RUSSIAN  CITY  IN  TRANSITION: A STYLIZED VIEW 
 
8.       An effective and convenient way of visualizing the changing nature and functions of 
the Russian city, from a city under central planning to the so-called “modern” city model, is 
via a diagram (Figure 2) in which four basic areas of activity are represented by rectangles—
activities contributing to the national and local economies, later joined as the “enterprise 
sector”; “social” services, including education, health, housing (including utilities), and 
welfare; and typical “municipal services,” such as police, street cleaning, garbage collection, 
urban transportation, etc.  The four areas are overlain by a lightly shaded area representing 
city responsibility, a more darkly shaded area representing the responsibilities of the state 
(federal or regional level), and an unshaded area representing activities open to the private 
sector. 
9.       Under central planning (Figure 2A), the four activities are divided into two spheres of 
responsibility, with no area open to the private sector.  State-owned enterprises primarily 
supply  goods and services for national distribution, whereas the city administration supplies 
social and municipal services plus goods and services for local consumption (bakeries, 
hairdressers, florists).  This rather simple picture is complicated by the fact that under central 
planning many state-owned enterprises provided housing, utilities, and other social services 
to some or all of their employees.  In some cases, they also participated in road-building and 
other typically municipal responsibilities.  This occurred mostly in cases of large state-owned 
enterprises, which, while located in the cities, were under the jurisdiction of the central 
government ministries.  
10.       We have assumed that many Russian cities may eventually evolve in the direction of 
the traditional Western city (Figure 2C), or possibly the new paradigm for a modern city 
(Figure 2D).  The traditional city under a market economy provides most of the municipal 
services, including some utilities, and some social services (including a small amount of 
public housing); it regulates other utilities, some of which remain government owned.  The 
city does not normally engage in direct production of goods and does not own other firms.  
Under the new paradigm, city administration has been reduced to the minimum (see, for 
example, Stein, 1990).  Much of the city budget is used to provide public funding and 
subsidies for privately provided public and municipal services, including some low-income 
housing.  A growing number of cities in the industrialized West are somewhere between 
stages C and D.  Since Russian cities are being reinvented in the transition, the option of 
“leapfrogging” directly into paradigm D for some services cannot be ruled out.  Indeed, given 
the general fiscal stress of the cities and the federal government, this may be the best option.   - 8 - 
Figure 2.  The Changing Role of City Government 
 
 
11.       The Russian city in transition (Figure 2B) most closely portrays the current situation 
of the Volga capitals and lies between the two extremes. City governments are still 
responsible for social and municipal services, including a varying, but typically large, share 
of housing and associated utilities and communal services.  Indeed, some of these 
responsibilities, such as housing, pre-school education, and health care clinics and hospitals, 
have been transferred to cities from privatized, formerly state-owned enterprises.  At the 
same time, most cities have privatized part of their communal housing stock and some of the 
related communal services and utilities (especially heating services).  Privatization of social 
services also has occurred in some services, mostly health care and, to a lesser extent, 
education.  But the continuing housing subsidies that create such a heavy burden on city 
budgets result from the combined effects of housing acquisition from privatized enterprises, 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































1b. The City in Transition
NATIONAL ECONOMY MUNICIPAL SERVICES
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12.       Despite the substantial privatization of small enterprises, Russian cities still own a 
residual share of small firms providing goods and services for local consumption.  At the 
same time, cities have received some ownership rights from higher government levels for 
some, mostly medium-sized, enterprises (see left side of Figure 2B).  It is interesting to note 
that, in the new private-sector environment, some cities own properties jointly with private 
companies, complicating their role as regulator, tax collector, and facilitator of economic 
development.  
13.       Figure 2 and the above discussion concentrate on various models of city functions, 
with implications for the expenditure side of their budgets.  The evolution of the revenue side 
is no less significant.  At this point in the transition, a decision has been made to continue 
largely with the old Soviet system of unified collection of revenues and tax sharing among 
the various levels of government. This pattern is not exclusively Soviet; it is common in a 
number of countries in Western Europe.  Also common to other countries is the system of 
federal and regional equalizing transfers that has persisted, with some changes, from the old 
regime.  The main development in this system is the increasing independence of lower levels 
of government in determining expenditures, and the creation, through legislation, of more 
stable and long-term sharing and transfer patterns.  
14.       Perhaps the main difference between the budget of a typical Russian and Western city 
at present is the very small contribution of property, and especially residential, taxes to the 
revenues of the Russian city.  This difference is, of course, a vestige of the old regime, which 
limited both private property and independent taxation by local government.  Given the heavy 
burden of housing and utilities on the expenditure side, the lag in transition of the housing 
sector to the normal Western pattern represents a major obstacle to the creation of a modern 
Russian city and is a significant barrier to the improvement of Russia’s general fiscal 
position.  This represents a major challenge of transition in the coming years at the local 
government level. 
III.   COMMON TRENDS IN THE EVOLUTION OF THE CITY AS  
GOVERNMENT 
 
15.       To gain some perspective on the governmental functions exercised by the Russian city 
in transition, we look first at the role of municipalities in overall fiscal activity.  Their 
revenue and expenditure shares indicate substantial fiscal decentralization in the Russian 
Federation between 1992 and 1997, so we then look more closely at the decentralization 
process.  Using Volga cities as a case study, we employ regression analysis in an attempt to 
explain the patterns of revenue and expenditure decentralization and local government 
dependence on transfers from the regional center. In addition, since transfers and tax-sharing 
arrangements with higher levels of government largely determine the revenues of local 
governments, we use regression analysis to try to explain the variation in major categories on 
the expenditure side of local budgets.  Finally, we examine more closely the evolution of the 
structure of expenditures, with a special focus on subsidies and expenditures on housing and 
utilities, the single most important category of expenditure.   - 10 - 
A.   Fiscal Decentralization and Volga Cities 
 
16.       As mentioned above, an important part of the transition has been an increase in the 
power, responsibility, and economic resources of lower-level governments—-changes that 
have redefined their role.  Decentralization of government is popular everywhere, as it brings 
the decision-making process closer to the users of government services.  But economic theory 
recognizes that decentralization is limited by inefficiencies of small scale and external effects 
that go beyond the administrative unit.  Additional limitations also may arise from deviations 
from nationally set goals and policies, lower skills and human capital at the local level, and 
favoritism, rent seeking, and corruption attributable to weaker local democratic control. 
17.       Appendix Table 1 indicates the changing fiscal role of all municipalities, or third-tier 
local governments, in Russia.  Between 1992 and 1997, revenues after transfers at the 
disposal of local governments increased from 23 to 30 percent of consolidated general 
government revenues.  This increase resulted largely from a rise in the local shares of 
property taxes and “other taxes,” not in the traditional shared taxes or transfers. Expenditures 
including transfers increased from 15 to 29 percent of consolidated general government 
expenditures, with municipalities increasing their responsibilities for education, the national 
economy, and social protection.  
18.       The process of fiscal decentralization
8 takes place at two levels—(1) from the federal 
level to the regions and (2) from the regions to local governments.  There is little uniformity 
at the first level, as regional governments have negotiated different power-sharing 
arrangements with the federal government. In particular, the federation republics, beginning 
with Tatarstan, have negotiated greater autonomy and more favorable revenue sharing 
arrangements. As a result, Ministry of Finance data show that, between 1992 and 1994, the 
shares of consolidated regional governments in general government total revenues and final 
expenditures increased from 43% and 25% to 64% and 47%, respectively (Appendix Table 
2). Since then, federal authorities have tried to reclaim part of the revenue pool and shift 
more spending responsibilities to sub-national governments. The first part of this strategy was 
achieved in 1994–1996 and the second in 1997, with the result that in 1997 the share of sub-
national governments in revenues (61 percent) was more commensurate with their share in 
expenditures (55 percent) than at the outset of reforms. 
19.       Within regions, local government's share in the consolidated regional budget rose 
insignificantly between 1992 and 1997, when they averaged 70 percent of revenues and 66 
percent of expenditures (Appendix Table 2).  Overall, the process of fiscal decentralization 
was much more dynamic at the federal level; at the regional level, local governments 
passively absorbed a relatively constant share of the enlarged subnational budgets. In Volga 
regions, these shares have remained slightly below the national average since 1994. The 
                                                 
8 This process is discussed in Le Houerou (1995) and Freinkman et al. (1998). See MFK 
Renaissance (1998a) for a useful table defining the expenditure responsibilities of different 
levels of government.   - 11 - 
“Law on Financial Foundations of Local Government” established minimum tax shares for 
municipal areas, but these are average shares for the region.  The shares for local budgets are 
negotiated annually and differ dramatically across the cities of any given region.   The larger 
cities typically redistribute collections from their jurisdiction, through the regions, to other 
areas of the region.
9   
20.       In what follows we concentrate on the dynamics and main determinants of fiscal 
decentralization to local governments in the Volga regions, narrowing the analysis to fiscal 
outcomes in “cities under regional jurisdiction” (CRJs)—typically cities with a population of 
over 25,000.  Capital cities in all Volga regions dominate their respective CRJs tier, and in 
the comparative analysis of the Volga capitals undertaken in the second part of this article we 
use several policy indicators for CRJs as proxies for the capitals.
10  Two alternative measures 
of fiscal decentralization are defined:
11  (1) the ratio between the per capita total revenues (on 
a net transfer basis) of CRJs to those of the consolidated regional government,
12 which may 
be termed the revenue-based decentralization measure, and (2) the ratio between the per 
capita total expenditures of CRJs to those of the consolidated regional government, which 
may be called expenditure-based decentralization. 
21.       Freinkman and Yossifov (1999), using similar definitions for all regions of the 
Russian Federation, identified two different models of fiscal decentralization to local 
governments—(1) “true decentralization,” achieved by granting local governments higher 
shared tax revenues and larger receipts from local taxes and non-tax revenues (typical for 
ethnically Russian regions--oblasts and krays); and (2) the “redistribution model”—
characterized by the heavy reliance of local budgets on transfers from regional 
administrations (observed predominantly in ethnic republics and autonomous okrugs).
13  On 
the national level, republics and autonomous okrugs lag well behind oblasts and krays in the 
                                                 
9
 As noted in Freinkman et. al. (1998), these shares may be explained in part by the share of 
urban members in the regional Duma.  The stronger the representation of urban districts in 
the regional legislature, the smaller the share of city revenues redistributed to other local 
budgets outside city jurisdiction. 
10 The average share of CRJ population living in the capital city in Volga regions in 60%, 
varying from 44% in Tatarstan to 85% in Astrakhan'. 
11 Precise definitions of the variables used in the construction of these measures appear in the 
explanatory notes to Appendix Table 2. 
12
 All measures used from this point onward are based on “net transfers” unless otherwise 
indicated.  
13 These models are independent of what occurs on the expenditure side. Regions exercise 
varying degrees of control over municipal expenditures, but no measure of such control is 
available.   - 12 - 
average degree of revenue and expenditure decentralization.  We shall return to these two 
models during interpretation of some of the regression results; however, we shall first discuss 
the basic facts of decentralization.  
B.   Fiscal Outcomes in Cities under Regional Jurisdiction 
 
22.       Appendix Table 2 shows the average values of the two measures of fiscal 
decentralization in Volga region CRJs over the period 1992–1997 (measures for individual 
Volga regions are shown in Appendix Table 1).  Decentralization of fiscal responsibility to 
CRJs has taken place somewhat more rapidly than has decentralization to all local 
governments in Volga regions.  At the same time, local government budgets in CRJs (both in 
Volga regions and at the national level) remained far less dependent on transfers from the 
regional center than the average municipality.    Furthermore, local governments in Volga 
region CRJs rely significantly less on this source of revenue than the average local 
government in CRJs of the Russian Federation. Thus, decentralization to urban areas has 
proceeded faster than decentralization to small towns and rural areas and along the lines of 
the "true decentralization" model identified by Freinkman and Yossifov 1999. The partial 
correlation coefficient between the two measures of CRJ decentralization, obtained by 
controlling for region-specific “fixed effects,” 14 is high (0.68) and statistically significant at 
the 99 percent level of confidence.  Tatarstan and Ul’yanovsk Oblast clearly lag behind other 
regions in the degree of decentralization to CRJs.  In 1997, Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast and 
Chuvashia ranked first and second in terms of these criteria.   
23.       Appendix Tables 4 and 5 also highlight the dependence of CRJ spending on transfers 
from higher levels of government, particularly in Chuvashia, Tatarstan, and Tver’ and 
Astrakhan’ oblasts.  The share of net regional transfers in CRJ total budget expenditures for 
Ul’yanovsk Oblast was the second highest among the 10 Volga regions through 1995, but fell 
after that to become one of the lowest.  Overall, the data on fiscal outcomes in Volga CRJs 
are broadly consistent with the tendencies observed at the national level. 
24.       Appendix Tables 4 and 5 show the shares of different revenue items in local 
government budgets in Volga region CRJs  and in the Russian Federation in 1992 and 1997.  
Because the magnitudes and trends in revenue structure are similar, we review developments 
at the national level, with only occasional reference to the Volga regions.  Between 1992 and 
1997, “shared taxes”
15 fell by 27 percentage points. The sharp decline was caused primarily 
                                                 
14 The partial correlation coefficient is obtained by first transforming the observations over 
time on both variables for each region into differences from the respective regional means. 
The transformed data are then stacked on top of one another and the Pearson correlation 
coefficient is obtained.  
15 The profit tax, personal income tax, value-added tax, and excise taxes are often referred to 
as “shared taxes” because by law they are collected by the federal government and then 
shared with sub-national governments in more or less fixed ratios.   - 13 - 
by the erosion of the tax base in the enterprise sector; it was offset only partially by higher net 
transfers from the regional administration budgets. At the same time, “own taxes,” 
comprising property and other taxes accruing by law to sub-national governments only, grew 
more than threefold and were 26 percent of total revenues by 1997. On a real per capita basis, 
“own revenues,” which also include non-tax revenues, increased on average from 51 to 115 
constant 1990 rubles in Volga region CRJs   In 1997, they were highest in Tatarstan and 
lowest in Astrakhan’ Oblast; they were everywhere, except in Tatarstan, higher than own 
revenues of regional governments or other local governments.  As noted by Zhuravskaya 
(1998) and Freinkman and Yossifov (1999), the expectation that regional governments will 
respond to any increase in local revenues by reducing tax shares or transfers not only 
discourages local governments from introducing such taxes, it encourages them to hide 
whatever new revenues they mobilize.  The strong increase in budgeted own revenues is 
surprising in light of these observations. 
25.       The first part of the panel data regression analysis presented below explores the 
relationship between decentralization and socioeconomic and political developments in the 
Volga regions.  The cross-sectional dimension of the panel is comprised of the 10 Volga 
regions, while its time dimension encompasses the period 1992–1996.
16  The results are 
specific to the Volga regions and cannot be generalized to the entire set of Russian regions.  
A brief description of explanatory variables follows. 
Administrative and political factors: 
 
  1. Dummy variable for type of administrative region (1 = republic, 0 = oblast).  
  
  2.  Dummy variable for regional voting patterns (1 = “Red Belt”, 0 = other). The five 
“Red Belt” regions (Astrakhan’, Volgograd, Saratov, Ul’yanovsk and Cheboksary)  are 
defined as those favoring the Communist Party candidate Gennadiy Zyuganov over 
incumbent President Boris N. Yeltsin in both the first and second rounds of the 1996 
presidential elections.
17   
 
  3. Dummy variables for above-average rank on policy reforms in the capital city (1= 
above average, 0 = other) and average rank (1= average, 0 = other); these ranks are derived 
later in the paper and shown in Table 14.  As shown in Appendix Table 6, the classification 
of regional CRJs into three reform groups, based on reforms in the capital cities, explains a 
major part of the observed variability in important economic and fiscal indicators (in 
repeated-measures ANOVA).   
 
                                                 
16 The 1997 budget data for CRJ local governments was not used because of the lack of 1997 
regional data for several explanatory variables.  
17 For more on the Red Belt and the elections, see Clem and Craumer (1996, Figure 2).    - 14 - 
Economic and social variables: 
18 
  
  1.  Real per capita monthly income in region (1990 rubles). 
 
  2.  Index of physical volume of industrial production in region (1990 = 100).  
  
  3.  Rate of infant mortality in region (number of babies per 1000 live births who died 
before reaching the age of one). 
 
  4. Index of physical volume of industrial production in capital city (1990=100).  
 
  5.  Dummy for a strong agricultural base ( 1 = “strong agricultural base”, 0 = other), 
based on the ratio of agricultural to industrial production in 1995.   Tver’, Cheboksary, 





  1.  Cash revenues as a percentage of consolidated regional budget revenues in 1997 
(in percent) (MFK Renaissance, 1998b).  This 1997 observation is used for each year of the 
sample on the assumption that it is indicative of relative rankings throughout the period. 
 
  2.  Net federal transfers as a percentage of consolidated regional expenditures 
including transfers to the federal government. 
 
  3.  Net regional transfers as a percentage of CRJ expenditures including transfers to 
the regional government. 
 
  4.  Real per capita CRJ budget expenditures on national economy, education, health 
and sports, and social protection (1990 rubles). 
 
26.       Table 2  presents the regression analysis for the main determinants of fiscal 
decentralization and subordination in Volga CRJs, where fiscal subordination is defined as 
the share of net regional transfers in total CRJ expenditures.
20 As seen in columns two and 
                                                 
18
 Data on the first three variables are derived from Goskomstat Rossii (1997a, 1997b), and 
for the second two variables from de Melo and Ofer (1999). 
19 All budget data for local governments in CRJs were extracted from a database compiled by 
Dr. Alexei Lavrov from standard reporting forms filed by regions with the federal Ministry of 
Finance. For a description of the database, see Lavrov (1996). Price indices and population 
data are taken from de Melo and Ofer (1999). 
20  The regressions presented in Tables 2 and 3 were tested for the presence of 
heteroskedasticity and correlation in regression residuals, using the White test for general   - 15 - 
three, both decentralization measures are negatively related to the index of real regional 
industrial production, which was located primarily in the cities. The respective OLS 
coefficients indicate that decentralization of revenues and expenditures is likely to be 2.8 and 
5.3 percentage points higher, respectively, for every 10 percentage-point additional drop in 
regional industrial output.  In part, fiscal decentralization was used to help compensate cities 
for the rapid erosion of the local economy. Administrative status is another important 
determinant of fiscal decentralization to CRJs, as decentralization measures in the two 
republics (Tatarstan and Chuvashia) are on average about 14 percentage points lower.  No 
significant statistical relationship was found between decentralization and indicators of 
regional wealth, such as real per capita income or average wages in the region or capital city.  
27.       In addition to the common explanatory factors, revenue decentralization is negatively 
associated with the rate of infant mortality, a crude measure for the incidence and severity of 
poverty. While not influenced by regional poverty, expenditure decentralization is on average 
7.3 percentage points lower in “Red Belt” regions. This probably reflects the unwillingness of 
conservative regional administrations to part with the old Soviet model of centralized fiscal 
arrangements.  Expenditure decentralization also shows a negative time trend (-5.2 
percentage points per year), which roughly offsets the increasing annual expenditures 
associated with declines in industrial production. 
                                                                                                                                                       
heteroskedasticity.  The test statistics are computed using auxiliary regressions in which the 
squared residuals are regressed on a constant, the explanatory variables from the original 
regressions, and all possible, non-redundant cross products of the explanatory variables, with 
the exception of those involving dummy variables 0, and the Durbin-Watson test for first-
order serial correlation.  In panel-data models, the estimation of the Durbin-Watson statistic 
requires prior transformation of the regression output. First, the residuals for the different 
cross-sections are stacked on top of one another, separated by additionally included “n.a.” 
values. Then, the standard formula of the Durbin-Watson statistic is applied to this 
augmented set of residuals). In the regression for the degree of fiscal subordination of CRJ 
local governments, the estimated value of the White statistic is statistically significant at the 
95 percent level of confidence and consequently the reported t-statistics are calculated with 
the White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors of ordinary least square (OLS) 
coefficients.   In three cases, the Durbin-Watson statistic fell in the inconclusive region, and 
on one occasion it dropped below the lower boundary of the one percent critical value. 
Because of the short time dimension of the panel and the difficulty of interpreting the Durbin-
Watson statistic in panel-data models, no attempts have been made to correct for the possible 
existence of serial correlation in OLS residuals. The overall fit of the estimated regressions is 
high, with values of the adjusted R2 falling within the range of 0.58 to 0.83.   - 16 - 
Table 2. Determinants of Fiscal Decentralization and Subordination 
Notes: 
Unless otherwise noted, data on explanatory variables is regional and the OLS coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 99% level of confidence. 
Unless otherwise noted, numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics. In regressions in which the estimated value of the 
White test statistic is statistically significant at the 95% level of confidence, the t-statistics are calculated with 
the White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors of OLS coefficients. 
** Lower and upper limit of the 1% significance points for the Durbin-Watson statistic. 
*** P-value. 
 
Ratio of real per capita 
total revenues on net 
transfer basis of CRJs 
and consolidated 
regional government
Ratio of real per capita 
total expenditures on 
net transfer basis of 
CRJs and consolidated 
regional government
Net regional transfers 
as percent of CRJs 




Index of physical volume of 
industrial production
-0.28                
(-6.03)




Net federal transfers as percent of 
consolidated regional budget 
expenditures a/
0.32               
(2.95)
Cash revenues as percent of 
consolidated regional budget 
revenues in 1997




Dummy variable Above-average 
rank of policy reforms in capital city
-17.65             
(-6.86)
Dummy variable Average rank of 
policy reforms in capital city
-10.35             
(-3.89)
Dummy variable Red Belt -7.27
 (-4.07)
Dummy variable Republic -14.75 -14.11
  (-6.73)  (-6.27)
Sample 1992 - 96 1992 - 96 1992 - 96
Total Panel (Balanced) Observations 50 50 50
Adjusted R-squared 0.69 0.66 0.77
Durbin-Watson 1.50 1.43 1.02
    (1.24; 1.49) **     (1.20; 1.54)  **     (1.20; 1.54) **
White's Heteroskedasticity Test 5.41 6.46 17.12
        (0.37) ***         (0.37) ***         (0.01) ***
Regressors  / Dependent Variable  - 17 - 
28.       The regression presented in the last column of Table 2 suggests that CRJ local 
governments in cash-short regions are unlikely to follow the “redistribution model” explained 
above.  It also shows that regions receiving large federal grants relative to the size of their 
consolidated expenditures tend to impose a higher degree of subordination on CRJ local 
governments.  However, the central finding in this regression is that CRJ local governments 
that are less dependent on regional transfers tend to have average or above-average ranks on 
policy reforms.  Thus, it is possible that the “redistribution” model of fiscal decentralization 
is associated with weak policy reform, presumably because it is associated with less policy 
freedom at the local level and because it weakens the incentives of local governments to 
provide better services in anticipation of higher tax receipts.  De Melo and Ofer (1999) have 
provided additional evidence that reform is associated with greater independence at the city 
level.  Earmarked grants to promote the implementation of unpopular measures may help to 
counteract such weakened incentives. 
C.   City Budgetary Expenditures 
 
29.       Appendix Tables 4 and 5 present trends in the structure of expenditures of local 
governments
21 in the Volga region CRJs and in the Russian Federation in 1992 and 1997.  
The two main expenditure items in CRJ budgets are the “national economy” and 
expenditures on public services.  Halligan et al. (1995) referred to expenditures on the 
national economy as “sunset” and those on public services as “sunrise,” to capture their 
backward- and forward-looking characteristics.  Over time, subsidies are expected to shrink 
and expenditures on social services such as health and education are expected to expand. 
30.       Since 1992, the expenditure on the “national economy,” the largest budgetary item 
during the Soviet period, has preserved its significance in local government budgets, 
remaining slightly above 40 percent of total expenditures in Volga region CRJs.  However, 
its nature has changed significantly.  Subsidies to industry and agriculture, large items in the 
past, have almost disappeared, whereas subsidies to housing, including utilities, have 
increased.  In fact, housing subsidies have become the single largest expenditure item in 
municipal budgets, and their dominance in all Volga CRJs is striking.  They are therefore 
discussed in a separate section below.  Subsidies to public transport account for almost 15 
percent of “national economy” expenditures, so there is significant room to increase cost 
recovery in all Volga cities, but especially in CRJs in Samara and Yaroslavl’ oblasts  and 
Tatarstan, which subsidize their public transportation systems at levels above the Russian 
average.  The sharp increase in energy prices has contributed to rising transport costs, 
however, and some subsidization of public transportation is considered a legitimate public 
expenditure.  Direct support for industry has declined in all Russian CRJs to a mere 1 to 2 
percent of expenditures, a healthy development, although regions still spend about 4 percent 
                                                 
21  As pointed out by Freinkman and Yossifov (1999), some local budget expenditures are in 
fact controlled by officials at the regional level; this is particularly true in regions relying 
heavily on offsetting of non-cash payments, given economies of scale in this type of activity.   - 18 - 
of their budgets to support industry and a variety of hidden subsidies is likely to exist.  
Among the Volga CRJs, only Yaroslavl’ still provided a significant but declining level of 
explicit support for industry. 
31.       Looking at trends, the biggest increase in expenditure shares of local governments in 
CRJs was for social protection.  This sharp increase reflects in part the 1994 addition of 
“allowances for children and other social transfers” (previously classified under other 
expenditures) to the budgetary classification “social protection” (Lavrov, 1996). The highest 
real per capita outlays in 1997 occurred in Tver’ and Chuvashia (Appendix Table 1). The 
least support for social protection was in Tatarstan, reflecting a preference for subsidization 
of food and other subsistence items over direct support to the poor.  Outlays for education 
also showed a general upward trend, surpassing those on health and sports to become the 
second largest expenditure item of local governments in CRJs.  In real per capita terms, CRJ 
expenditures on education and health are the highest in Tatarstan (reflecting both high budget 
revenues and high budget shares) and lowest in Ul’yanovsk, where they are only a third of 
those in Tatarstan.  Education expenditures by cities of regional jurisdiction have increased in 
all but two regions (Chuvashia and Saratov), but health expenditures have declined 
everywhere except in Tatarstan and Yaroslavl’ Oblast.  This is consistent with the increasing 
delegation of responsibility for education and health to the local level and the tendency of 
local governments to move health off budget. Tatarstan appears to be making a major 
commitment to investment in human capital, as expenditures by the regional administration 
in health and education are also high compared to other regions.  
32.       Table 3 presents regressions explaining differences in the provision of public goods 
and services by CRJ local governments in the Volga regions.  One explanation for the pattern 
is regional income, which is clearly associated with real per capita expenditures in the major 
categories considered.  The OLS coefficients imply that a difference of 10 rubles in monthly 
real per capita income in two otherwise identical regions is associated with 6.2, 6.7, and 10 
rubles higher real annual per capita spending, respectively, on education, health and sports, 
and national economy in the higher-income region.  Spending on social protection is, 
however, negatively related to income, reflecting the equity considerations behind this type of 
spending. The predicted CRJ per capita expenditure (1990 values) on education is on average 
11.8 rubles lower in “Red Belt” regions and 21.8 rubles higher in republics.  
33.       CRJs of regions that experienced a sharper drop in real industrial production in the 
capital city tend to spend more on national economy (housing, transport, and enterprise) 
subsidies.  However, those in agrarian regions (regions with high ratios of agricultural to 
industrial production) have markedly lower real per capita spending on the national 
economy—weaker demand for enterprise subsidies is not offset by expanded support for 
agricultural producers outside city limits.   - 19 - 
Table 3. Determinants of CRJs Provision of Public Services 
Notes: 
Unless otherwise noted, data on explanatory variables is regional and OLS coefficients are statistically 
significant  
at the 99% level of confidence. 
Unless otherwise noted, numbers in parenthesis are t-statistics. In regressions in which the estimated value of the 
White test statistic is statistically significant at the 95% level of confidence, the t-statistics are calculated with 
the White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors of OLS coefficients. 
** Lower and upper limit of the 1% significance points for the Durbin-Watson statistic. 
*** P-value. 
 
34.       Regression results indicate negative time trends of real per capita CRJ outlays on 
health and sports, and national economy.  In the case of national economy, this reflects the 
gradual withdrawal of local governments from housing and enterprise subsidies.  In the case 
of health and sport, it may be consistent with national health care reform objectives, which 
may also explain why real per capita spending on health and sports is higher in CRJs where 
the capital city has average, rather than above average, ranks on policy reform. Spending on 
social protection shows an upward trend, but this is difficult to interpret given the change in 
Education Health and Sports Social Protection National Economy
Constant 198.75
(2.86)
Index of physical volume of 
industrial production in capital city
-1.10            
(-2.71)
Real per capita monthly income 0.62 0.67 -0.07 1.00
(47.17) (22.45)  (-4.94) (3.74)
Time trend -7.38 5.67 -26.03
  (-6.07) (10.09)  (-4.00)
Dummy Republic 21.76
  (6.46)
Dummy Red Belt -11.80
  (-4.81)
Dummy variable Above-average rank 
of policy reforms in capital city
6.00            
(3.46)
Dummy variable Average rank of 
policy reforms in capital city
11.64            
(2.50)
Dummy Strong Agricultural Base -61.97
 (-4.62)
Sample 1992 - 96 1992 - 96 1992 - 96 1992 - 96
Total Panel (Balanced) Observations 50 50 50 45
Adjusted R-squared 0.82 0.72 0.67 0.58
Durbin-Watson 1.82 1.05 1.43 1.36
    (1.24; 1.49) **     (1.24; 1.49) **     (1.24; 1.49) **     (1.20; 1.54) **
White's Heteroskedasticity Test 1.49 6.51 6.08 13.27
        (0.68) ***         ( 0.26) ***         ( 0.30) ***         (0.15) ***
Regressors  / Dependent Variable
Real per capita CRJs budget expenditures on:  - 20 - 
budget classification mentioned earlier.  The regressions also highlight differences in 
spending patterns on social protection between reform-oriented and more conservative CRJs.  
Those with above-average ranks on policy reforms boast real per capita outlays (in 1990 
values) on average 6 rubles higher than elsewhere.  Thus, local governments embarking on 
market reforms with high social cost appear to at least provide a better safety net for the 
affected parties.  
D.   Housing and Utilities 
 
35.       Excluding Moscow and St. Petersburg, city expenditures on housing and utilities 
occupy some 40 percent of CRJ budget outlays, or about 80 percent of their national 
economy budget (Appendix Table 4). In terms of the national economy, this expenditure 
alone may have amounted in 1997 to 3–4 percent of GDP (based also on Appendix Table 1).  
Eliminating or reducing this burden would clearly represent a major step in promoting 
transition.  In the United States, for example, municipalities spent in 1991 about 20 percent 
of all expenditures on “environment and housing,” clearly a broader category (Bahl, 1996, pp. 
82-83). 
36.       Most of the Volga CRJs have similar or higher housing expenditure shares; a number 
of cities have housing shares of 35 percent or more (Table 4).  City case studies give evidence 
of attempts by the federal government and some governors and mayors to increase the extent 
of cost recovery in the housing and utility spheres against the resistance of legislatures.  
Resistance arises because housing and utility costs increased more than the price of goods 
and because charges can only be increased by administrative order.  But since housing costs 
were initially set at very low levels, they need to be increased radically, especially during 
periods of inflation. 
37.       One of the main obstacles to increasing the rate of cost recovery for rents and 
utilities
22 is the very low income of large segments of the population.  Average cost recovery 
for housing in Russia in 1997 was 35 percent, and the average share of housing in income 
was 16 percent.
23  Such figures can be compared with federal government targets in 1993 to 
reach full cost recovery by 1998 at 20 percent of income.  A more recent federal target was 
established in 1997, calling for full cost recovery by 2003 at 25 percent of income (Institute 
of Urban Economics, 1998b). 
38.       CRJ data on housing subsidies for 1997 are shown in Appendix Tables 4 and 5 and 
Figure 4.  Housing subsidies typically cover utilities, as well as housing rents.  Recent data 
show that housing subsidies are particularly high in the city of Nizhniy Novgorod, and levels 
                                                 
22  “Cost recovery” refers to the percentage of the total expenditure by the housing/utilities 
provider that is recovered through rent and other payments. 
23 For the Volga capitals the share of housing in income in 1997 ranged from 6 percent in 
Ul’yanovsk to 13 percent in Samara (Institute for Urban Economics, 1998b).   - 21 - 
of cost recovery there and in Ul’yanovsk  are relatively low at around 30 percent.  By 
contrast, cost recovery is around 40 percent in the cities of Yaroslavl’, Kazan’, and Samara.  
Budget subsidies are around 20 percent in the cities of Yaroslavl’ and Kazan’ and 31 percent 
in Samara.  Part of the problem for Nizhniy Novgorod and Samara lies in the higher cost of 
housing in these two cities; however, differences in the housing shares in income suggest that 
Nizhniy Novgorod and Ul’yanovsk are lagging in the cost recovery effort. 
 
Table 4. City Housing Subsidies, Cost Recovery Rate and Share of Population Income 
Sources: Goskomstat, Regionyi Rossii, Vol. 2, 1997; (a) MOF budget data for Cities under Regional Jurisdiction (CRJs) 
in respective regions; (b) Data on individual cities from the Institute of Urban Economics, Moscow. 
 
 
39.       Privatization helps to reduce the city’s burden of rent subsidies, but not necessarily 
utility subsidies. In some cities—at least Samara, Kazan’, and Yaroslavl’— there are also 
efforts to incorporate or privatize utilities, especially heating; to improve housing 
maintenance and management; and to introduce competitive bidding for the provision of 
these services.  But cities are likely to remain deeply involved as partial owners.  The 
privatization of housing was accompanied in most cities by the creation of condominium-
type arrangements referred to as “housing owner associations”; these were established to 
represent owners in dealing with maintenance, services, and housing transactions.  There is a 
corresponding development of private real estate companies. 
40.       Table 5 shows that the share of state ownership in many Volga cities is 20 percent or 









Region, % of 
Eligible Stock
1995 1996 1997 1997 b/ 1997 b/ 1997
Tver 33 35 31 - - 47
Y a r o s l a v l 3 03 03 0 4 0 1 0 4 2
Nizhni Novgorod 27 31 34 30   7 39
Chuvashia / Cheboksary 38 32 43 - - 27
Tatarstan / Kazan 33 28 25 40   8 50
Ulyanovsk 42 38 35 30   6 29
Samara 32 32 35 40 13 38
S a r a t o v 2 63 83 7 - - 4 3
V o l g o g r a d 3 13 32 4 - - 5 2
A s t r a k h a n 4 24 13 6 - - 4 8
Housing Subsidy Share in 
Budget Expenditures a/ CRJs or Capital Cities  - 22 - 
privatized a substantial share of their apartments,
24 they had in the meantime acquired 
additional housing from enterprises.  Thus, many cities still own between one-third and one-
half of all housing. The only exception in 1994 was Saratov, where a majority of housing 
remained under enterprise ownership.  Recent partial data on ownership of city housing stock 
shows that at least three cities (Samara, Volgograd, and Astrakhan’) have reached or are on 
the threshold of attaining the halfway point for private ownership of housing stock.  
 
Table 5. Ownership of Housing Stock in Volga Cities 
(Percent ss of January, 1997) 
Sources: Compiled by authors from Goskomstat Rossii, 1999b, p. 18; 
Institute for Urban Economics, 1998a; city case studies; and city 
statistical bulletins. 
 
a/ As of January, 1996. 
 
 
41.       Housing is but one part of a broader problem of urban real estate management.  In 
recent years, Saratov and Samara have moved toward privatizing land and creating a real 
estate market by leasing urban property.  In Yaroslavl’, the World Bank is conducting an 
experiment in creating the legal and economic infrastructure for taxation of housing and land.  
Land registration and valuation are being implemented in Tver’, where new information 
technology is being used to aid in land delimitation and conveyance, tenure registration, and 
dispute resolution.  These and other efforts are needed  in order to reduce the housing burden 
on municipal budgets.  The creation of secured property rights in land and real estate, and a 
free market in these assets also will facilitate the establishment of a mortgage market, which 
distributes the financial burden of purchasing and renovating apartments and houses over a 
longer period of time and makes them more affordable.  
42.       On the revenue side, Appendix Table 4 shows that Russian CRJs, the Volga cities 
included, have managed to raise the share of property taxes in their budgets from a mere 2 
percent in 1992 to about 12 percent of all revenues or 16 percent of all tax revenues in 1997.  
                                                 
24 These ranged from highs of 52, 48, and 47 percent in Volgograd, Astrakhan’, and Tver’, 
respectively,  to lows of 27 and 29 percent in Cheboksary and Ul’yanovsk. 
Cities State Muncipal Private
Public and 
Collective
  Cheboksary  a/ 76 11 9 9
  Kazan a/ 16 40 22 21
  Samara a/ 12 39 49 -
  Volgograd 4 42 50 -
  Astrakhan 8 37 49 6  - 23 - 
These property taxes fall mostly on businesses rather than residential property.  By contrast, 
in the United States, property taxes account for 25 percent of total local revenues, half of 
local own-source revenues, and 75 percent of all local taxes (Bahl, 1996, p. 91; see also 
Mikesell, 1993, Ch. 3). 
43.       A major challenge to municipalities and also to the federal government in the coming 
years will be removing most housing costs from the expenditure side of the budget and 
transforming the real estate, housing, and land sector into a tax base on the revenue side.   To 
illustrate, a reduction of expenditures on housing by half as a share of the budget and a 
doubling of revenues derived from property would create a city budget surplus of 30 percent 
and an increase in net fiscal revenues of some 3 percentage points of GDP.   Note that these 
levels are still far below the net contribution of housing and real estate to the local budgets of 
typical Western cities.  Change in this direction will increase the independence and economic 
viability of the cities and their economy, and will also go a long way toward alleviating the 
national problem of tax collection and fiscal imbalance. 
IV.   COMMON TRENDS IN THE EVOLUTION OF THE CITY  AS  ECONOMIC 
CENTER 
 
44.       One can find both theoretical reasons and empirical evidence to demonstrate that 
cities often act as “engines of growth.” The theory has to do with externalities arising from 
the impetus for innovation and spread of knowledge provided by the proximity of people in 
cities (Glaeser et al., 1992).  Yet, local governments are sometimes accused of being more 
interested in controlling than in encouraging business.
25  Such conflicting forces are further 
complicated in the Volga and other Russian regional cities by the fact that economic 
prospects depend to a large extent on the success of large state-owned industrial enterprises.  
Such enterprises traditionally were the major source of employment and taxes but have been 
adversely affected by the more competitive environment accompanying market reform.   
45.       Both regional and city authorities have been engaged in efforts to maintain production 
and employment levels in  enterprises under their jurisdictions.  These politicians have been 
active in lobbying the federal government to secure production orders, to extend credits, to 
pay wage arrears, and to reduce tax burdens for enterprises in their jurisdiction.  And they 
have pressured banks to lend money to enterprises.  In several cases, local governments have 
been instrumental in finding foreign investors to help restructure enterprises.   Despite these 
efforts and substantial privatization, declines in industrial production of large enterprises 
continued through 1997.  The growing city economy depends largely on privatized and new 
private small and medium-sized firms.  Therefore, in the discussion that follows, we 
concentrate on the performance of this new private sector, on the character and diversity of 
the new business environment, and on the interaction of these firms with city government.  
                                                 
25 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, for example, came to this conclusion during work with small 
and medium enterprises in Russia.   - 24 - 
Our information is derived from a recent survey of small and medium enterprises in six 
Volga capitals.  
A.   Survey of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
 
46.       In October 1998, the authors commissioned VICOM, a professional polling firm in 
Russia, to carry out a survey of 60 firms in 6 of the 10 Volga capitals—Samara, Saratov, 
Kazan’, Ul’yanovsk, Volgograd, and Astrakhan’.  Our questionnaire focused on aspects of 
the business environment that could be affected, but not necessarily controlled, by the cities.  
It also examined economic performance, but did not attempt to explain it, as this would have 
required a broader inquiry into interlocking ownership patterns and other forms of business 
association that often determine access to credit and to reliable suppliers and customers.
26  
47.       It was decided to concentrate the survey in one industry to control for the “noise” 
created by industry-specific problems.  Textiles and clothing was selected as a typical 
consumer goods industry with a reasonably uniform product, which included both privatized 
and newly private firms, and which had witnessed the start-up of many small and medium 
businesses in both trade and production.  A typical “light industry,” it sustained a pronounced 
decline in output during the first years of transition.  Furthermore, the state of textiles and 
clothing firms in 1998 is probably a reasonable indicator of the level of recovery of the local 
economy.  During the survey, an effort was made in each city to include an equal number of 
production and retailing firms.  
48.       Survey firms were selected randomly from the business registries of the cities and 
then screened for three criteria— number of employees, ownership, and activity.
27  All firms 
are private, with at least 10 full-time employees but less than 500.  The person interviewed 
was the director of the firm or the director or deputy director of finance.  In order to eliminate 
the effect of the August 1998 financial crisis in Russia, the respondent was asked to “answer 
the questions as you would have answered them before the current crisis.”  
49.       The main firm characteristics are presented in Table 6; additional data are provided in 
Appendix Tables 7 and 8.  About half the firms were formerly in collective or state 
ownership and subsequently privatized and half were new private firms (start-ups).  The 
average firm age was 4.4 years, ranging from 1 to 7 years; privatized firms tend to be older.  
The average number of employees per firm (43) ranged from 67 in production enterprises to 
23 in enterprises engaged in trade, a natural difference.  Four larger production firms were 
interviewed in Volgograd and two in Astrakhan’, raising the average firm size in these two 
cities.  Otherwise, most firms had less than 100 employees.  Privatized firms tended to be 
                                                 
26  See Hendley et al. (1998) for a discussion of these factors. 
27 Despite prior screening, one firm in Astrakhan’ and one in Ul’yanovsk did not satisfy all 
these criteria and were excluded. Thus, tabulations are based on 58 firms. Some questions 
were not answered by all firms.   - 25 - 
larger, with an average of 68 employees versus 22 for new private firms.   In what follows, 
we discuss the results of the survey under four subheadings: overall findings, variation by 
main characteristics, variation by firm profitability, and variation by city.  Under each 
subheading we distinguish general outcomes from interaction with city government, where 
the latter covers a variety of areas, such as taxation and registration, where local government 
at least influences, if not controls, the environment. 
 




50.       Overall findings. As evident in Appendix Table 7, more firms (one-third) reported 
losses in 1998 than reported large profits (13 percent), and more firms reported a decline in 
labor productivity since 1997 (40 percent) than reported a rise (21 percent). Also, more firms 
reported a decline in employment since 1997 (53 percent) than reported an increase (22 
percent).  At this stage of the transition, and after a number of years of privatization, a decline 
in employment is likely to reflect a problem rather than “positive” restructuring.  Thus, the 
outlook for business in 1998 was not encouraging.  The average monthly wage for a typical 
production or sales employee at the end of 1997 was 383 thousand rubles, only slightly above 
the average cost of minimum subsistence and less than half the statistically recorded monthly 
average wage in cities.  More than half the production firms surveyed reported wage arrears, 
of three months on average.
28  And yet wages were less than a quarter of expenditures 
excluding intermediate goods; investment accounted for 9 percent, and taxes for 67 percent. 
51.       The survey also addressed various aspects of the relationship between firms and city 
government—taxes, registration, price control, quality of municipal services, quality of 
business services the city might have encouraged, government direct assistance, and attitude 
toward private business (Appenedix Table 7).  As indicated above, firms reported that they 
                                                 








 Old       
( > 4 years)
New       
( < 4 years)
Large       
(  >= 20 
Employees) 
Small       
( < 20 
Employees)
I. Firms' characteristics
1. Number of firms 58 27 28 27 31 39 19 28 30
2. Past ownership (% privatized state firms) 47 48 43 100 0 56 26 57 37
3. Main activity (% engaged in production) 47 100 0 48 45 46 47 68 27
4. Average period under private ownership (years) 4.4 4.4 4.3 5.1 3.8 5.5 2.2 4.5 4.4
5. Average number of employees in 1998 43 67 23 68 22 51 28 76 13
6. Position of person interviewed (% owners) 53 52 54 48 58 51 58 46 60
7. Firms reporting large positive profits in 1997 (%) 14 12 19 11 17 18 5 7 21
8. Firms reporting negative profits in 1997 (%) 33 38 22 33 33 32 37 32 34
Size of Firm Years Private
Questions / Grouping Variables
Type of Firm Past Ownership
Total  - 26 - 
paid 67 percent of expenditures excluding inputs on 14 different taxes—including five city 
taxes; other taxes were regional and federal.   More than half of the firm executives 
interviewed considered corruption as the first or second most difficult problem they 
confronted, and slightly fewer ranked local government inefficiency at the top of their list; the 
two problems are, of course, closely related.  
52.       Almost all firms needed to have licenses, but only eight indicated that they were 
difficult to obtain.  Twenty-three firms reported some form of price control, including seven 
that were subject to controls on their retail margins. More firms evaluated as “good” rather 
than “poor” the quality of utilities, but with more positive responses for public transportation, 
electricity, and communications than for water and sewage and garbage collection, which are 
more directly under municipal responsibility.  Net negative grades were assigned to street 
maintenance and lighting, public and property safety, and the quality of arrangements for 
legal settlement.  
53.       More than half the firms recognized the existence of a business center in their city, 
but only eight firms indicated actual use, four of which found some business center services 
useful.  Although many firms would have liked to have received local government support, 
especially to locate space for their business and to help obtain credit, more than one-third 
wanted the city to simply not interfere in their business.
29  Finally, despite these problems, the 
city government received a net positive evaluation of its attitude toward private business, 
which was better than the evaluation of attitudes of the regional government and of the 
general population. 
54.       Business services available in the city (Appendix Table 7) other than insurance, which 
largely still is provided by the state, were evaluated as superior to  municipal services.  And 
respondents in more firms indicated that the level of trust among business partners is good 
rather than poor.  Only 11 firms (20 percent) reported that crime was a major problem and a 
much smaller number (only 4) said that organized crime, the “Krisha,” concerned them the 
most. Still, six firms admitted paying protection to such umbrella organizations.  Finally, 
more firms found the attitude of the population toward  private business to be positive rather 
than negative, although the positive margin was not enormous (25 percent on a net basis). 
55.       Variation by main characteristics.  We now direct our attention to an examination 
of survey results based on the different types of firms.  New private firms tend to be smaller, 
slightly younger, and somewhat more successful than privatized firms.  They have 
experienced a smaller declines in productivity and have higher levels of investment.  Smaller 
firms (less than 20 employees) more often than not are new private enterprises, engaged in 
                                                 
29 Firm responses here can be compared to those reported in Frye and Shleifer (1997), where 
74 percent said local government had no influence on business, 11 percent said it helped, and 
15 percent said it hindered business. International agencies have assisted in the establishment 
of business centers in Nizhniy Novgorod, Volgograd, Samara, Yaroslavl’, and Tver’.  These 
cities plus Ul’yanovsk had special programs to assist and train small businesses.   - 27 - 
trade, and faring somewhat better than larger firms (see Table 6).  They reported higher 
profits (but a sharper decline in profits after 1997) and paid higher wages; they also reported 
fewer arrears and invested more.  Firms engaged in trade/distribution are smaller, younger, 
less in arrears, and generally slightly more successful than production firms.  They pay better 
wages but experienced a sharper decline in employment over the period 1997–1998. 
56.       In general, new private, younger, and smaller firms engaged in trade, when compared 
with privatized, older, and larger firms in production, are doing relatively better and are more 
flexible in staffing; however, their fortunes fluctuate more with ups and downs (down in 
1998) in the general economy.  They are part of the new wave of emerging market firms, 
enjoying the advantages of the market economy but suffering from its volatility.  The 
privatized, older, and larger firms in production find it more difficult to maneuver in the new 
environment, as they carry with them the heavy burdens and culture of the old system.  
57.       Differences also emerge with respect to the character of the various types of firms’ 
interactions with city government.  Although tax levels do not differ between trade and 
production firms, larger firms, privatized firms, and younger firms report paying higher 
taxes— in all cases above 70 percent of their expenditures excluding inputs.  This compares 
to smaller firms, new private firms, and older firms that pay less than 65 percent. These tax 
differentials may be explained by the fact that larger and privatized firms are more visible, 
and younger firms are less experienced in dealing with the tax authorities.  The 
representatives of the larger production firms also complained more frequently about 
obtaining licenses and to some extent also suffered more from price controls. 
58.       Production firms and new private firms have a somewhat lower opinion of the quality 
of municipal and business services.  Older and privatized firms were more aware of the 
existence of a business center.  Of the eight firms that used a center, six were among the older 
firms.  The users were mostly seeking assistance in obtaining business space and credit, but 
half of them agreed with non-users—mostly new, small trade firms—that the best thing 
government could do is not interfere. 
59.       There were more complaints about government inefficiency among smaller, new 
private, and older firms, and more accusations of corruption among smaller and new private 
firms.   Smaller, older firms complained more about crime, but all four firms acknowledging 
a relationship with the Krisha are newly established.  Three are new private firms and three 
are small.  Trade firms found a higher level of business trust among partners than did 
production firms.  And small, older, privatized firms in trade found the attitude toward 
private business of the city government and the general population to be more positive than 
other firms.  
60.       Variation by level of profitability.  Seven firms reported substantial profits; 30 
firms small or no profits; and 18 firms reported losses.   Loss-making firms tended to be 
smaller, older, privatized, and engaged in production. Operationally, loss-making firms had a 
stronger tendency to reduce employment; they suffered more from declining productivity and   - 28 - 
paid lower wages—an average of 341 versus 461 new rubles per month for profitable firms.  
Loss-making firms also had more arrears and invested much less than profitable firms. 
61.       A major difference between profitable and loss-making firms, and possibly a major 
source of the difference in profits, was the level of taxation.  Loss-making firms reported 
paying fewer but much higher taxes—72 percent of expenditures after inputs compared with 
43 percent on average for profitable firms.  If true, the lower tax payments by the profitable 
firms must be a major factor in their high profitability.  Profitable firms also had fewer 
problems obtaining licenses; indeed, some profitable firms may have operated without one.  
Two-thirds (12) of the loss-making firms, mostly in production, labored under some kind of 
price control, and more than half the firms under price controls lost money during the 
reported period.  Curiously, loss-making firms did not complain more than other firms about 
crime or government inefficiency and corruption.  Indeed, profitable firms tended to worry 
more about the latter.  Loss-making firms encountered more positive attitudes toward them 
on the part of regional officials and the public than did profitable firms; on the contrary, 
profitable firms found only the municipal government mildly well disposed toward them. 
62.        Profitable firms are as critical or appreciative as other firms are of the level of 
municipal services, but they are more critical of public safety and protection of property and 
of the level of business services.  None of the successful firms utilized the services of the 
business center.  Like other firms, most successful firms received no assistance from the city 
government and did not desire its intervention in daily business operations.  None of the 
profitable firms reported relations with organized crime (all those that did were small profit 
earners); nor did they complain more about Krisha or crime being a problem.  They did, 
however, report experiencing a higher level of trust among business partners.  The picture of 
profitable firms that emerges from the survey data is that they appear to be managed by 
independent, possibly daring, entrepreneurs, who are striving to reduce their tax burden, 
avoid government interference, and who rely more on mutual business relationships to 
conduct business.  
63.       Variation by city.  As proposed at the outset, this first major part of the paper 
concentrates mainly on general patterns of transition in the Volga cities rather than on the 
particular variations between them.  For this reason we summarize the findings of the survey 
in a very concise way here, before focusing on possible reasons for divergence in economic 
performance among the cities in the following major section.  Table 7 presents a ranking of 
the cities according to the performance of their surveyed firms (column 1) and then according 
to firms' views on the quality of municipal policies, municipal services, business services, 
and the overall business environment in the respective cities.  The rankings are achieved by a 
simple weighting system that gives positive and negative points for above- and below-
average ratings of the cities.  All information under each category (i.e., each section) is 
assigned equal weights and the points are added to produce the ranks shown in the table.  An 
overall ranking is presented in the far right-hand column. More detailed data are provided in 
Appendix Table 8.   - 29 - 




a/ Rankings range from 1 (highest) to 6 (lowest) and are based on firm responses to survey questions grouped by city. 
 
 
64.       As shall become apparent in the second part of the paper, the overall ranking of the 
cities' business environment conforms closely with  their rankings on both policies and 
outcomes,
30 with Volgograd, Samara, and Kazan’ at the top and Saratov and Ul’yanovsk at 
the bottom among the surveyed cities.  With respect to economic performance, firms in 
Ul’yanovsk are faring the best, followed at some distance by Kazan’, Volgograd, and 
Saratov, and with Samara ranking near the bottom.  Although the performance of the firms in 
Samara and Ul’yanovsk is at odds with the perceived business environment (a phenomenon 
addressed again below), the results for the other cities are more or less consistent. 
V.   EXPLAINING DIFFERENCES  IN  ECONOMIC  PERFORMANCE  AND  
LIVING  STANDARDS SINCE  1990 
 
65.       In this section the focus is on the comparative experience of regional capitals as 
microcosms of change. We use comparative rankings to look at differences among the 10 
Volga capitals in initial conditions and in the pace and pattern of economic reform.  We then 
suggest hypotheses about how initial conditions and policy may be related to socioeconomic 
outcomes.  Other factors affecting socioeconomic outcomes include institutional 
arrangements conferring greater flexibility to certain regions in the realm of policy formation 
(as codified in power-sharing agreements with the center),
31 different political arrangements 
                                                 
30  See also de Melo and Ofer (1999). 
31  By August 1997, Tatarstan, followed by Chuvashia and Nizhniy Novgorod, Tver’, 
Saratov, and Samara oblasts, had concluded bilateral “power-sharing” agreements with the 









Kazan 2 4 2 3 1/2 2/3
Samara 5/6 1/2 3 2 4 2/3
Saratov 4 5/6 5 4 6 6
Ulyanovsk 1 3 6 5 5 5
Volgograd 3 1/2 1 1 3 1
Astarkhan 5/6 5/6 4 6 1/2 4
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within the regions
32 and other special conditions such as spillover effects caused by proximity 
to important neighboring regions. 
A.   Initial Conditions 
 
66.       Table 8 presents a variety of information on the Volga capitals as of 1990, a year of 
relative stability and therefore a useful point of departure. The cities are listed according to 
their position (from upstream downward) on the Volga River.  As is apparent, five had 
relatively large populations in 1990 (~1 million or more), with the remaining five in the half-
million population range or slightly larger.  Less than half of the cities are located in regions 
possessing natural resources of national significance.  Three regions, Tatarstan and Samara 
and Saratov, were major oil production areas in the Volga-Urals fields (Sagers, 1991, p. 260), 
the country’s major oil-producing region in the 1960s and much of the 1970s prior to the 
development of the West Siberian fields.
33     Many of the cities  possess favorable 
geographic locations at the intersection of important rivers, roads, rail lines, and pipelines, 
but Nizhniy Novgorod, Samara, Yaroslavl' and Tver seem to be particularly well situated.  As 
of 1990, however, these apparent advantages were not manifest in above-average living 
standards. 
67.       Data on per capita income for the Volga capital cities are not available, but average 
monthly wages in 1990 (Table 8) in the cities were quite similar
34 and slightly below the 
Russian average of 297 rubles.  Available data on living standards fail to reveal any clear 
                                                                                                                                                       
property, regulation of branches of industry, and ownership and use of natural resources, the 
terms of the specific agreements tend to vary widely. 
32  According to Malyakin (1997), two different political arrangements can be found in the 
regions covered by this study.  In one (Samara and Nizhniy Novgorod [under Boris Nemtsov] 
oblasts , Chuvashia, and Tatarstan), the governor forms a “power pyramid,” based on an 
alliance with the center and acceptance by the local elite.  The governor is rewarded for this 
cooperation with the center by a grant of virtual autonomy.  A second arrangement is 
characterized by weaker regional leadership (e.g., Saratov Oblast prior to the appointment of 
Dmitriy Ayatskov as governor), which invites intervention by the center into the region’s 
affairs.  Generally, the level of political independence of city leaders from regional governors 
tends to be much less than that of the governors from Moscow (for additional details, see de 
Melo and Ofer, 1999, pp. 13-15). 
33 Saratov and Astrakhan' possessed sizable commercial deposits of natural gas, but these 
were not well developed. 
34The spread between the highest (Saratov, Tver’) and lowest (Samara, Cheboksary) average 
wages was less than 5 percent.  Monthly wages at the regional level, typically lower than in 
the capital city, had a spread of less than 10 percent.   - 31 - 
differences.   Only Samara seems to stand out as unfortunate, with the highest infant 
mortality and a low per capita trade in consumer goods and services. 
 
Table 8. Initial Conditions in Volga Cities, 1990 
 
Sources: Compiled by authors from Goskomstat Rossii, 1995, pp. 28, 32, 195; 1998a, Vol. 1, pp. 145-147, 159-161, 194-196, 180-
182, 243-245, 250-252, 257-259, 271-273, 278-280, 285-287 and Vol. 2, pp. 98, 106; 1999a, p. 10; 1999c, p. 260;  city case 
studies; various city statistical bulletins; and Segodnya, February 18, 1999, p. 6. 
 
a/ Classification based on 1985 data in Gaddy (1996) and author’s estimates. 
b/ Cheboksary is the capital of the Chuvash Republic, also know as Chuvashia, and Kazan is the capital of Tatarstan 
Republic. All other regions are oblasts with the same name as the capital city, e.g. Tver is the capital of Tver Oblast. 
 
 
68.       Although the Volga cities all were industrial centers, important differences existed in 
1990 in terms of the size and structure of industry.  Such differences are likely to help explain 
subsequent economic outcomes, especially given the severe shocks to industry during 
transition.  An initial shock was the 1992 price liberalization and the associated opening of 
the Russian internal market to international trade.  The price liberalization resulted in a large 
increase in  the  relative prices of energy and other raw materials, raising input costs for 
heavy industry.  The increased competition from imports hurt Russia’s light industry.  A 
second shock was the drop in central government procurement orders, which affected the 
demand for military production and research, construction and industrial machinery, as well 
as cars and planes for civilian use.   A third shock was the disintegration of the pervasive 
distribution network organized by the center; most enterprises had no internal sales 
departments or marketing strategies.  
Tver   460 275 153 17.7 31    <10
Yaroslavl   635 271 149 14.8 44 10-15
Nizhni Novgorod 1421 271 151 14.9 44 25-35
Cheboksary b/   429 264 133 13.0 50    <10
Kazan b/ 1103 266 169 18.4 47 25-35
Ulyanovsk   637 270 145 20.0 46 10-15
Samara 1260 264 140 23.3 43 25-35
Saratov   907 275 145 20.3 41 15-25
Volgograd 1003 271 140 15.2 41    <10
Astrakhan   482 265 142 18.1 34    <10
Memo item
Average for Volga Cities 1197 269 147 17.6 42 …
Russian Federation 148543 297 158 17.4 30    <10
Capital Cities
Monthly Per Capita 
Retail Trade in 
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69.       Industrial employment shares in 1990 were as high as 50 percent in Cheboksary and 
as low as 31 percent in Tver’ (Table 8).  Within industry, wide differences in industrial 
structure were apparent from an industrial census of Russian enterprises conducted in 1989 
(as cited in Ivanov, 1998). Chemicals and petrochemicals, as well as energy, were important 
in Yaroslavl’, Volgograd, Kazan’, Saratov, and Samara.
35  Metallurgy was well developed in 
Volgograd (25.8 percent of sales volume of industrial products in 1989); and metal working 
and machine-building was important in Ul’yanovsk (60.5 percent) and Nizhniy Novgorod 
(57.7 percent) known for cars, in Cheboksary (48.2 percent) and Volgograd (26.4 percent) 
known for tractors, in Saratov (27.9 percent) and Kazan’ (20.2 percent) known for airplanes, 
and in Astrakhan’ (15.2) and Yaroslavl’ (25.8 percent) known for river and sea-going vessels.  
In addition, Astrakhan’, Cheboksary, and Tver’ relied heavily on food industry, textiles, and 
other consumer goods (light-industrial products) as bases for their industrial sector.    These 
variations in structure are interesting in light of Ivanov (1998), who uses an ex post analysis 
of changes in quantity, price, investment, and employment to show that light industry and 
machinery/metal-working have become the two least competitive sectors in Russian industry 
as a whole.   
70.       Substantial differences among the Volga cities existed in terms of two other 
characteristics shown in Table 8; their implications, however, are not clear.  One is the share 
of defense employment in total industrial employment.  On the one hand, defense industries 
present an enormous task for restructuring; on the other, the high level of human capital 
associated with defense industries would seem to provide an advantage.  Nizhniy Novgorod 
(then known as Gor’kiy) was classified as a closed city during most of the Soviet era, and 
restrictions to foreigners also applied to Saratov, Samara, and Volgograd, presumably 
because of the sensitivity of the type of military production there.  The other characteristic is 
the relative strength of the agricultural base.  Using the ratio of agricultural to industrial 
output as an indicator, four cities— Tver’, Cheboksary, Saratov, and Astrakhan’—are located 
in regions with a relatively strong agricultural base.   But here again it is not clear whether 
this is an advantage or a disadvantage.  On the one hand, relatively high inter-regional 
transport costs mean that a strong agricultural base can help keep low food prices in the 
capital city and promote low industrial wages.  On the other, agriculture is generally 
unreformed and cash poor, placing additional pressure on available public revenues.  In both 
cases, we shall assume that the advantages and disadvantages of these characteristics are 
offsetting. 
                                                 
35 Chemicals and petrochemicals accounted for 47.7  percent of the total sales of industrial 
products in Yaroslavl’, 31.6 percent in Kazan’, 26.9 percent in Saratov, and 26.2 percent in 
Volgograd, and 15.4 percent in Samara.   - 33 - 
Table 9. Expectations of  Success in Volga Cities Based on Initial Conditions 
 
 
a/ 2 = below average; 1 = average; 0 = above average. 
b/ 2 = low; 1 = medium; 0 = high. See text for ranges. 
c/ 1 = present. 




71.       What then might be the expectations of success for the different regional capitals 
based on initial conditions?  The above review suggests that the most important factor in 
success might be the ability to adjust to the severe industrial shocks experienced during the 
early years of transition.  Therefore, Table 9 provides a ranking of the cities’ situations based 
on four criteria for ease of industrial adjustment: (1) a low share of industrial employment in 
the urban labor force; (2) low share of industry in the two “least competitive” sectors, light 
industry and  machinery/metalworking; (3) low industrial specialization; and (4) special 
advantage derived from a favorable location or natural resource endowment.
36  If these 
                                                 
36 Criterion 1 is taken from Table 8, and criteria 2 and 3 are taken from data on the industrial 
census of 1989 (see Ivanov 1998).  For criteria 1 and 2, a rank of 2 is 10 percent or less than 
the average and a rank of 0 is 10 percent or more than the average; a rank of 1 reflects close 
to average value.  For criterion 3, low specialization (rank of 2) is considered to exist where 
none of the eight industrial sectors identified in the census accounts for more than 25 percent 
of volume of sales, and high specialization (rank of 0) is considered to exist where at least 
one of these sectors accounts for more than 45 percent of sales.  None of the Volga capitals 
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Tver 2      0  d/    1  d / 14
Yaroslavl 1 2 0 1 4
Nizhni Novgorod 1 0 0 1 2
Cheboksary 0 0 0 - 0
Kazan 0 2 1 1 4
Ulyanovsk 0 0 0 - 0
Samara 1 2 1 1 5
Saratov 1 2 1 1 5
Volgograd 1 2 1 - 4
Astrakhan 2 2 1 - 5
Total Capital Cities  - 34 - 
criteria alone have a decisive impact on restructuring, Cheboksary and Ul’yanovsk, each with 
a total score of 0 would be expected to encounter the most pronounced problems with 
adjustment during transition.  Nizhniy Novgorod (with a score of 2), would be expected to 
perform significantly better, but not as well as the four cities receiving a rank of 4.   Samara, 
Saratov and Astrakhan', with a rank of 5, would appear to have the best prospects for success. 
B.   Economic Policies 
 
72.       The pace and pattern of economic reform varied widely among the Volga capitals 
between 1990 and 1997.  Here we examine differences in city policies in four categories—
pricing, fiscal policy, privatization, and support for business development.  The section ends 
with a summary ranking of cities by policy reform .  
73.       Pricing.   During the Soviet era, government subsidies reduced consumer prices 
substantially below costs in two main categories—food products and services, the latter 
including housing/utilities/public transport, as well as cultural, household, and personal 
services.  Food prices were reduced through heavy subsidies to the agricultural sector. Rent 
and prices for utilities and public transport were reduced by explicit or implicit government 
subsidies and by direct provision of housing and utilities by enterprises. Underlying subsidies 
were provided through low energy prices.  
74.       Food prices.  The 1992 price liberalization eliminated subsidies from the center for 
almost all marketed goods, including most food products.  Local governments attempted to 
maintain low food prices through a variety of methods, including restrictions on exports to 
other regions (Ul’yanovsk, Saratov), administrative price controls, ceilings on production 
profits and trade mark-ups (Ul’yanovsk, Astrakhan’, and Yaroslavl’), and requirements for 
enterprises to supply part of their production at lower prices, sometimes as an offset to taxes.   
In order to control for overconsumption, Ul’yanovsk also developed a very elaborate 
rationing system.  Such methods typically had adverse budget implications,
37 which forced 
local governments to gradually abandon controls and increase the extent of recovery.  Food 
prices tended to be the highest in Nizhniy Novgorod and Samara and lowest in Ul’yanovsk 
and Volgograd, with prices in Saratov, Cheboksary, and Kazan’ falling in between. 
75.       Direct food subsidies were partially financed at the regional level.  In Ul’yanovsk 
Oblast, for example, food subsidies absorbed more than half of the regional administration 
funds for social protection, thus accounting for 5 to 10 percent of the budget at that level.  
More commonly, regional governments have devoted a large share of their budget to 
agricultural subsidies as a complement to direct price controls. The largest supporters of 
                                                 
37 More recently, local officials have used restrictions, including taxes and quality 
requirements, on regional imports to keep prices higher; the most common example is 
restriction of vodka sales in such areas as Tatarstan, Nizhniy Novgorod, and Tver’. Here the 
objective is to protect producers, typically public enterprises, rather than consumers.   - 35 - 
agriculture, as indicated by expenditure shares in the regional consolidated budget for 1997, 
were Saratov (17 percent) and Tatarstan (11 percent).
38  
76.       Services.  Data on the prices of basic municipal services
39 in eight Volga cities at the 
end of 1996 (de Melo and Ofer, 1999, Appendix Table 5) indicated that prices in Ul’yanovsk 
again tended to lie at the lower end of the spectrum.  Prices for services appeared to be 
highest on average in Nizhniy Novgorod. 
77.       Overall price indicators.  Baranchuk (1998) has provided three alternative general 
rankings of the effects of price controls in the Volga cities (Table 10)—the proportion of 
goods and services subject to price control; the severity of the price control method; and a 
comprehensive ranking based on direct price subsidies, fixed or maximum prices, rationing, 
restrictions on food-industry profitability, and price mark-ups (so-called 
Berkowitz/Baranchuk ranking, far right column Table 10).  All three rankings show that—
with the exception of Saratov, where price controls have been reduced—the “Red Belt”
40 
regions have the highest level of price control.  
78.       These rankings are corroborated by the costs of a standard set of 25 basic food items 
and a monthly subsistence minimum in the 10 Volga capitals (Appendix Table 6 in de Melo 
and Ofer, 1999).  Both measures indicate that costs are highest in Samara and lowest in 
Ul’yanovsk   They also indicate that prices are relatively lower in the cities of Astrakhan’ and 
Volgograd than in their surrounding oblasts and relatively higher in Nizhniy Novgorod than 
in its surrounding oblast.  These data are consistent with the city rankings on price controls 
showing more pervasive price controls in Astrakhan’ and Volgograd than in Nizhniy 
Novgorod. 
                                                 
38 The Russian average was about 5 percent in 1997. 
39  These included prices for city bus transportation, municipal housing, telephone service, 
electricity, water and sewage, hot water/heat, natural gas, central heating, and primary health 
care (physician services). 
40 As noted earlier, these include Astrakhan’, Volgograd, Saratov, and Ul’yanovsk oblasts 
and the Chuvash republic.    - 36 - 
Table 10. Price Controls on Goods and Services in 1995-1996 
Sources: TACIS, 1996; Baranchuk, 1998, pp. 6, 13. 
 
a/  The average percent for Russia is 18.1, 17.8 for all foods, 8.9 for non-food goods and 38.4 for services. 
b/ These rankings, used by Berkowitz and Branchuk, were originally provided in TACIS 1996 as regional 




79.       Municipal Fiscal Policy.  As indicated in a previous section of the paper,  three main 
sources of revenue are  available to cities—shared taxes, transfers, and own revenues.  None 
provides a clear indicator of fiscal policy at the municipal level.  Shared taxes depend on the 
annually negotiated sharing arrangements between the city’s surrounding region and the 
federal government, as well as on the sharing arrangements between the region and the city.  
City officials may influence such arrangements, which vary across regions and cities; but they 
do not control them. The third source, own revenues, is relatively small and may be 
maintained partly off budget.  The incentives for cities to operate extrabudgetary funds are to 
maintain legal control and to hide the size of their resources from regional authorities that 
might otherwise reduce their tax shares.  As documented by Mitchneck (1994), such funds 
are financed by fines, revenues from privatization, rental of municipal property, profits from 
direct economic activity, and carryover from any  previous-year budget surplus.   
Zhuravskaya (1998), however, determined that extrabudgetary funds either are very small or 
nonexistent at the local level, partly because there are no stable sources of revenues for such 
funds.  To the extent that this is true, this implies that budgeted own revenues could serve as 
a useful indicator of municipal tax effort.  
Percent of Goods 
and Services
Severity Berkowitz\Baranchuk b/
Tver   5-10 Below Average 1.1
Yaroslavl   5-10 Above Average 1.7
Nizhni Novgorod   10-17 Medium 1.6
Cheboksary   18-25+ Above Average 2.2
Kazan 10-17 Above Average 2.1
Ulyanovsk 10-17 High 4.4
Samara   5-10 Low 0.9
Saratov   5-10 Low 1.0
Volgograd 10-17 High 2.6
Astarkhan 18-25 Above Average 2.3
Memo item
Russia 18.1 a/ N/A N/A
Capital Cities  - 37 - 
80.       As noted above, the major categories of expenditure are “national economy” and 
public services such as education and health.  National economy expenditures are associated 
with the functions of the former Soviet government, which supported production through 
subsidies and supplied heavily subsidized housing and utilities to the population. Thus, the 
ratio between expenditures on “national economy” and expenditures on local government 
responsibilities for social services such as health and education has been seen by some as 
reflecting an important aspect of reform in Russian cities (Halligan, 1995; Zhuravskaya, 
1998), but it is not an unambiguous indicator.  This is because it is not always clear whether 
the subsidies under “national economy” are the old-style production and housing subsidies or 
more recent attempts to compensate enterprises for their support of social services.  Social 
spending by Russian enterprises on education and health, as well as on public housing and 
transport, was large prior to transition, representing as much as 20 percent of gross wage 
costs (Freinkman and Starodubrovskaya, 1996).  The transfer of such social spending from 
enterprises to municipalities, which thereby accept financial responsibility for such activities, 
is an important aspect of reform; hence the ambiguity. 
81.       Another factor making budgetary accounts difficult to assess is the valuation of 
revenues and expenditures made in kind.  At the regional level, budgetary non-cash revenues 
for the first 10 months of 1997 ranged from a low of 6 percent in Moscow City to a high of 
76 percent in Chuvashia (MFK Renaissance, 1998b, p. 22).  Most of the Volga regions had 
non-cash revenues of around 50 percent, so the size of non-cash revenues and the particular 
prices chosen to apply to in-kind transactions have implications for city as well as regional 
budgets.  Typically prices chosen to value in-kind transactions are some multiple of the 
market price and so tend to inflate these budgets. 
82.       Two indicators were selected to assess progress toward fiscal reform in the 10 Volga 
cities; they are shown in Table 11.  As indicated earlier, fiscal data for Cities under Regional 
Jurisdiction (CRJs) are used as a proxy for Volga capitals, as a consistent set of budgetary 
data for capital cities is not available.  The “tax effort” indicator is calculated as the per capita 
collection of “property tax” plus “other taxes” by CRJs in each region as a percentage of the 
annual wage in the capital city.
41  Cities retain 50 percent of the property tax, which is shared 
with regional governments, and so have a strong incentive for collection; other municipal tax 
shares are much lower.   And cities retain 100 percent of any “other taxes,” which they 
initiate.  Thus high collections of these taxes are likely to indicate proactive city 
administrations.  Interestingly, the highest tax effort using the average CRJ proxy over the 
period 1996-7 occurs in Saratov (7 percent), where wages are among the lowest, and in 
Kazan (6.1 percent), with one of the highest wages, and in Samara (5.6 percent).   The lowest 
tax effort is in Astrakhan’ (2.4 percent).  
83.       The “housing-subsidy burden” is calculated as the per capita housing subsidy in CRJs 
as a percentage of the annual wage in the capital city (average over the period 1996-97).  This 
                                                 
41 Non-tax revenues are excluded from this measure, as it is somewhat unclear whether such 
revenues are included in the budget or maintained off-budget; in any case, they are small.   - 38 - 
indicator is highest for Cheboksary (6.8 percent) and Nizhniy Novgorod (6.2 percent) and 
lowest for Volgograd (3.9 percent) and Ul’yanovsk (4 percent).  
84.       Privatization.  City governments were responsible for privatization of their housing 
stock and of small and medium enterprises.  Privatization rates are therefore an indication of 
local government efforts to establish competitive markets with clear property rights. Housing 
privatization also helps relieve some of the fiscal burden of cities. 
85.       Small enterprises. Most Volga cities privatized their small-scale enterprises early 
(1992–1993).  The most common initial approach was to lease shops or small companies, 
often with an option to buy; many lessees exercised this option.  After several years, tenders 
and auctions were used to achieve privatization.  In Nizhniy Novgorod, Volgograd, Samara, 
Yaroslavl’, and Tver’, international agencies, such as the International Finance Corporation, 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the European Union were 
involved in privatization, and it proceeded rapidly.  In Ul’yanovsk, small-scale privatization 
began later, with the main wave occurring in 1994–1995. And in Cheboksary, only 58 percent 
of the original municipally owned enterprises were reported as privatized by mid-1997.  
Unfortunately, there are no readily comparable statistics on small-scale privatization for all 
ten Volga capitals, so the policy indicator for privatization reflects housing only.  However, 
cities that privatized early and quickly are likely to score well on the indictor for small 
enterprise development discussed below. 
86.       Housing.  As a result of the first wave of apartment privatization, the ownership 
structure of city housing changed radically.  In Samara, for example, half the housing stock in 
1991 was owned by enterprises and more than one-third by the city; only 15 percent was in 
private hands—individual townhouses, rural houses incorporated into the city as it expanded 
over time, and cooperatives.  By 1996, however, half of the city’s housing stock was privately 
owned.  Privatization rates, however, are a better indicator of privatization policy than is 
ownership structure because of variations in initial levels of private ownership.  Table 11 
shows the shares of privatized housing for 1996; the Russian average of 39 percent was 
attained only in Volgograd, although several of the cities (notably Nizhniy Novgorod, 
Astrakhan’, and Tver’) had almost achieved the mean.  The lowest percentages of total 
housing stock privatized were in Kazan’ and Ul’yanovsk. 
87.       Support for business.  City governments also were responsible for the creation of a 
friendly and supportive environment for business-sector development (banking and financial 
services, attraction of foreign investment, other business services,  a favorable tax regime, 
simple procedures for registration and licensing, and business information and training).   To 
varying degrees, local governments also have been active in lobbying the federal government 
to secure production orders, to extend credits, to pay wage arrears, and to reduce tax burdens 
for enterprises in their jurisdiction.   The number of small enterprises per thousand residents   - 39 - 
and the efforts of city officials to attract outside (foreign) investment can serve as indicators 
of the commitment to foster a favorable business environment.
42 
 
Table 11. Reform Indicators for Fiscal Policy, Privatization, and Support for Busuness, 
Average Values 1996-97
 
Sources: Compiled by authors from Goskomstat Rossii, 1998a, Vol. 1, pp. 145-147, 159-161, 194-196, 180-
182, 243-245, 250-252, 257-259, 271-273, 278-280, 285-287 and Vol. 2, pp. 26, 300, 322-323; 1999a, p. 10-
11; 1999c, p. 152;  city case studies; city statistical bulletins; and authors’ calculations. 
 
a/ Per capita collection of "property tax" plus "other taxes" by local governments in CRJs as a percentage of the 
annual wage in the capital city. 
b/ Per capita housing subsidy by local governments in CRJs as a percentage of the annual wage in the capital 
city. 
c/ As a percentage of the entire eligible housing stock (number of units), 1996 
d/ Number per thousand of residents. 
e/ U.S. dollars per capita, for 1995 and 1996 combined. 
f/ 1996 data only 
g/ 1995 data 
h/ The corresponding figure for 1998 is 44 percent. 
 
                                                 
42 Hanson (1997) has observed the difficulty of devising usable indicators of a region's 
institutional adaptation to the market.  It is all the more difficult to establish such indicators at 













Flow of Total 
Foreign 
Investment e/
Tver 4.2 5.0 34 2.5 184
Yaroslavl 4.1 5.1 25 5.3   51
Nizhni Novgorod 5.4 6.2 33 3.9       41 f/
Chuvashia/Cheboksary 4.3 6.8     20 g/ 3.2 N/A
Tatarstan/Kazan 6.1 5.1 12 4.3   46
Ulyanovsk 4.5 4.0 12 3.2    1
Samara 5.6 5.8 27 5.8   30
Saratov 7.0 6.1 28 3.6 N/A
Volgograd 4.1 3.9 39 5.0   16
Astrakhan 2.4 5.7 32 3.9    2
Memo Item
Average for Volga regions 4.8 5.4 N/A 4.1 N/A
Russian Federation - - 39 h/ 5.8 N/A
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88.       Small enterprise development. Since 1991, there has been an explosion of the number 
of businesses registered throughout Russia.  Some were new independent businesses, others 
small and medium-sized enterprises privatized by the city government.  The growth of these 
two categories depends in part on local government privatization policies.  In addition, many 
small businesses were not registered at all (see, for example, Yakovleva, 1998).  According 
to most statistics, between one-half and two-thirds of all small businesses are in trade and 
restaurants; the rest are divided among consumer services, manufacturing, and construction. 
During the last years of the Soviet Union, 1990–1991, most Volga regions had about two 
enterprises per 1,000 people, resembling almost a “planning norm.”  Only Nizhniy Novgorod 
and Samara deviated on the lower end with significantly fewer enterprises, and Tver’ on the 
upper end with significantly more.  By 1996-97 the total number of enterprises was at least 
five times higher across the board.
43 
89.       The small-enterprise indicator shown in Table 11 must be interpreted with caution.  
First, although enterprises are concentrated in urban areas, particularly the capital cities, the 
indicator is for regions not cities.  Second, there are several problems with the statistics.  
Many Volga regions have experienced a decline in the number of registered small enterprises 
in recent years (e.g., see the totals for 1997 in parenthesis), possibly reflecting a consolidation 
of registries.  In addition, many small businesses are not registered at all (e.g., see Yakovleva, 
1998) or otherwise are not included in Goskomstat statistics (see Hanson, 1997). 
90.       Foreign investment.  Foreign investment can be an effective vehicle for enterprise 
restructuring, as it brings not only financing, but also modern technology, modern 
management, and ready-made export lines.
44  In the Volga region, foreign investors are 
attracted by the oil, gas, petrochemical, aerospace, and automotive industries.  However, 
actual investment appears to reflect the local business environment as much as the presence 
of these assets.  Nizhniy Novgorod quickly gained attention by attracting foreign investment 
and international support for enterprise restructuring and early privatizations, but Samara 
Oblast and Tatarstan appear to have matched, if not overtaken, Nizhniy Novgorod in offering 
a favorable business environment and good public relations.  Since January 1995 Tatarstan 
has provided an exemption from local profits and property taxes for three to five years to 
companies with at least 30 percent foreign equity totaling $1 million or more.  It also permits 
foreign investors to own land and buildings. Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaimiyev is 
seeking to attract domestic as well as foreign capital by floating special investment and oil 
bonds and selling government equity stakes in industrial companies.   Local government 
                                                 
43 Although most Volga regions are near the Russian average for small enterprises per 1,000 
residents (the number was 5.9 per 1,000 in 1997 and 1998), the latter is low by East European 
standards (Frye and Shleifer, 1997). 
44 This is documented especially clearly in the case studies for Samara, Ul’yanovsk, 
Volgograd, and Kazan’ (Volchkova, 1997; Lukyanova, 1997; Parfinenko and and 
Shcherbich, 1998; Andriyenko, 1997, respectively).   - 41 - 
officials in Samara have welcomed foreign businessmen enthusiastically and describe 
themselves as facilitators rather than controllers of business partners.  Astrakhan’ also has 
substantial international contacts, but these have not yet translated into substantial foreign 
investment.  
91.       Available city data for 1995 and 1996 in Table 11 indicate that Tver’ received the 
highest level of foreign investment by far, followed by Kazan’, Yaroslavl’, Nizhniy 
Novgorod, and Samara.  Typically the capital city receives higher foreign direct investment 
per capita than the remainder of the region, although this is not the case for Kazan’ and 
Samara oblasts, where some of the largest enterprises lie outside the capital city.
45   Tver’s 
high ranking reflects the region’s five-year exemption, granted to private investors starting in 
1995, from profit, property, and land taxes.  Subsequent data for 1997 show dramatic 
declines in foreign investment at the regional level in Tver’, so we also looked at studies 
ranking the general investment environment in Russian regions.  All placed Samara, 
Tatarstan, Nizhniy Novgorod, and, more recently, Saratov, at the top of the list, followed by 
Yaroslavl’, Volgograd, and Tver’, with Ul’yanovsk, Chuvashia, and Astrakhan’ at the 
bottom.
46  This ranking generally substantiates the use of data on foreign direct investment in 
cities as a proxy for favorable business environment.  
92.       Overall ranking on policy reforms.   Table 12 provides a ranking of policy reform 
in Volga capitals.  The comprehensive Berkowitz/Baranchuk indicator from Table 10 is used 
for price liberalization.  The other indicators are based on the data in Table 11.  Tax effort 
and “housing-subsidy containment” (the inverse of the “housing-subsidy burden” assessed 
earlier) are used to measure fiscal policy reform.  Housing privatization is used to reflect 
privatization policy; and the number of small-scale enterprises per 1,000 residents and 
foreign investment levels are used as indicators of support for local business development.  
The ranks reflect the standing of individual capital cities on these indicators.  With the 
exception of foreign investment, which exhibits a very wide variation among cities, a rank of 
2 is given where the value is 10 percent or more than the average, and a rank of 0 is given 
where the value is 10 percent or less than the average. A rank of 1 reflects close to average 
value.  The rankings in the right-hand column suggest that Samara and Nizhniy Novgorod are 
the most active reformers, followed by Tver’, Yaroslavl' and Volgograd.  Kazan’ and Saratov 
are located in the middle—less reformist than the aforementioned cities but more reformist 
than Astrakhan’. Cheboksary and  Ul’yanovsk lie at the bottom of the list. 
                                                 
45 See Appendix Table 2 in de Melo and Ofer (1999).   
46
 See Expert (1996) and  MFK Renaissance (1998b). Volchkova (1997) reported 212 joint 
ventures in Samara, as well as substantial involvement of large Western companies (Nestle, 
GM, Corning), and loans from both the World Bank and EBRD.   - 42 - 
Table 12. Overall Ranking of Volga Cities on Policy Reform 
Sources: Tables 9 and 10. 
 
a/ 0 = low; 1 = medium; 2 = high; 3 = very high. 
b/ 0 = below average; 1 = average; 2 = above average. 
c/ Assumption based on regional data. 
 
C.   Outcomes 
 
93.       Economic and social outcomes for the period 1990–1997 are no easier to measure 
than economic reforms.   One problem is that there is no satisfactory comprehensive indicator 
of economic growth in the Volga capitals.  Estimates of money income and GNP are 
available only at the regional level, and the city index of industrial production ignores any 
growth in services.  Another problem is that, because of differential inflation, indicators 
expressed in current rubles must be converted to more comparable values.
47  There are three 
deflator options: the cost of 25 basic food items in the capital city, the cost of minimum 
subsistence for the region, and the regional Consumer Price Index (CPI).   In the analysis that 
follows, “real” economic values are calculated using the CPI, which is the most broadly 
based deflator available over the longest period.  The CPI currently distinguishes nearly 400 
goods and services.
48  In measuring the living standard of lower-income groups, we use the 
cost of minimum subsistence, as it is more broadly based than the cost of the 25 food items. 
                                                 
47 Prices of non-traded goods can be expected to differ, but studies show that prices of traded 
goods also differ substantially from region to region, and only partly because of transport 
costs (Gluschenko, 1998; Berkowitz  and DeJong, 1998). 
48 Regional weights for the CPI are based on local household budget surveys, but they do not 
differ greatly across regions. Both the list of goods and weights change annually, allowing for 
variation in quality and taste, but variations from year to year are modest (see Gluschenko, 















Tver 2 0 1 2 0 3   8
Yaroslavl 2 0 1 1 2 2   8
Nizhni Novgorod 2 2 0 2 1 2   9
Cheboksary 1 0 0 0 0     0 c/   1
Kazan 1 2 1 0 1 2   7
Ulyanovsk 0 1 2 0 0 0   3
Samara 2 2 1 1 2 2 10
Saratov 2 2 0 1 0     1 c/   6
Volgograd 1 0 2 2 2 1   8
Astrakhan 1 0 1 2 1 0   5
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Figure 3. Real Monthly Wage and Ratio of Average Monthly Wage to Subsistence 
Minimum in Volga Cities, 1997 
 
Figure 4. Index of Physical Volume of Industrial Production in Volga Cities in 1997 
(1990=100) 
                                                                                                                                                       
of change starting in mid-1991, no initial price level is provided on which to base this 
change.  Since most prices in 1990–1991 were still fixed, and since they were fixed at the 
same level in the Volga regions, we assume that initial price levels were the same and the 


























Real monthly wage in 1990 rubles (left scale)
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94.       Economic outcomes.   As was the case in 1990, no data are available at the city level 
on per capita income, although this would be the single most comprehensive measure of 
economic success and living standards.  We therefore use the average real wage as an 
indicator of economic outcomes in Table 14.  Early in the transition, the real wage was a 
reasonably comprehensive measure of economic outcome.  But as the market economy 
develops, households benefit increasingly from new sources of income, including business 
profits, rents, and returns on financial assets.  We therefore discuss briefly here several other 
possible indicators of economic outcomes, including the available city-level data on 
industrial production and employment and overall changes in wages and employment.  
95.       Real economic wage.  Figure 3 and Table 13 show the 1997 average monthly wages 
in the Volga capitals in 1990 rubles—what is referred to here as the “real economic wage.”  
Unlike 1990, when wages were virtually identical across regions (Table 8), they now vary 
significantly. Tver’ had the highest real economic wage, followed by Kazan’, Samara, and 
Volgograd.  Ul’yanovsk had the lowest wages, only 60 percent of those in Tver’.  However, 
not only do wages vary among cities, but their disparity within cities has increased as well.
49  
96.       Industrial production and employment.  A decline in the absolute level of industrial 
production is associated with the shock of transition (see Easterly et al., 1994), and the index 
of industrial production declined continuously through 1996.  In 1997, the physical index of 
industrial production continued to decline in Volgograd, bottomed out in Astrakhan, Kazan, 
and Cheboksary, and reversed its trend in the other Volga cities. As shown in Figure 4, the 
smallest cumulative declines by 1997 were in Ul’yanovsk, Nizhniy Novgorod, and Kazan’.  
All three cities worked hard to protect their industry, and to some extent succeeded during the 
period under review.  The two largest declines were in Cheboksary and Saratov.  In 
Cheboksary, 80 percent of industry was in machinery/metalworking or light industry, the 
sectors noted earlier as being the least competitive.  In Saratov, only 34 percent of industry 
was concentrated in these two sectors, but the regional governor Dmitriy Ayatskov and his 
predecessors imposed a hard budget on enterprises without any serious efforts to improve the 
regulatory framework and market services required for business recovery.  In all Volga 
capitals, industrial employment also declined, but less radically than did production.  The 
disparity is explained in large part by substantial disguised unemployment, suggesting that 
further loss of jobs in declining industries can be expected in the future.   
97.       Changes in wages and employment.  Table 13 also shows changes in city employment 
and average real wages for 1990–1997; official city unemployment in 1997; and the stock of 
regional wage arrears at the end of 1997 as a percent of the monthly wage bill.  All these 
                                                 
49  Data for Samara, for example, indicate substantial differences arose among the various 
branches of employment.  that While the decline in the industrial wage was greater than the 
decline in the average wage, wages in the financial sector rose to five times the average wage 
and wages in education, science, culture, and health care fell to 60 percent of the average 
wage.   - 45 - 
indicators deteriorated everywhere in Russia, but the pattern of change suggests differences 
among the cities in labor market flexibility and associated policy interventions.  Some cities 
allowed wages to fall in order to preserve employment, and others tried to maintain wages 
and let employment absorb market pressures. 
 
Table 13. Real Economic and Social Wages, Employment and Unemployment, and 
Regional Wage Arrears in Volga Capital Cities 
 
(percentage changes over 1990-97 or 1997 levels) 
Sources: Compiled by authors from data in Statisticheskiy, 1992, p. 329; Le Houerou, 1995, pp. 133-134; Goskomstat 
Rossii, 1998a, Vol. 1, pp. 145-147, 159-161, 194-196, 180-182, 243-245, 250-252, 257-259, 271-273, 278-280, 285-287 
and Vol. 2, pp. 110, 755; 1998b, p. 173; 1999c, p. 260; MFK Renaissance, 1998b, p. 49; PlanEcon Report, April 28, 1994, 
p. 17; July 18, 1997, p. 18; and October 22, 1999, p. 8; city case studies; city statistical bulletins; and unpublished World 
Bank estimates. 
 
a/ Wage arrears as percent of the monthly wage bill. The stock of wage arrears is as at the end of 1997, wage data is 
for November, 1997. 
b/ Changes in city employment in capital city are assumed to equal regional ones. 
 
 
98.       A stylized view of labor market dynamics in Russia during the period 1990-96 (for 
which we have data for all 10 cities) is presented in Figure 5.  It shows three types of change, 
represented by shifts in the relevant curves—a decline in demand for labor (shift of LD
90 to 
LD 
96) a smaller decline in the supply of labor resulting mainly from the departure of women 
and a response to the decline in demand (shift of vertical LS 
90 to LS 
96); and a policy-driven 
countershift in the demand for labor, as city governments use a variety of means to avoid 
unemployment (shift from LD 
96 LD’ 
96).   Assuming that the shifts represent average 
movements, the equilibrium point would move from A0 to A1, which indicates some decline 
in both wages and employment.  Each Volga city is then positioned in Figure 5 according to 

















Tver 247 2.6 -3 -15 1.1 25
Yaroslavl 187 2.8 -31 -22 2.1 32
Nizhni Novgorod 190 2.7 -30 -11 b/ N/A 22
Cheboksary 185 2.1 -30 -17 5.3 37
Kazan 242 3.1 -9 -18 1.7 50
Ulyanovsk 158 2.7 -41 -15 1.5 39
Samara 227 2.9 -14 -7 3.6 12
Saratov 190 1.9 -31 -17 b/ N/A 36
Volgograd 205 2.6 -24 -17 b/ 1.4 35
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Figure 5. Labor Market in Volga Cities, 1990 and 1996 
(indexes equal 100 in 1990) 
 
 
Point A0 represents initial situation in each city (real monthly wage index and employment index = 100 in 
1990).  Stylized changes: LS
96 = decline in labor supply (women and others leaving the labor force); LD
96 = 
decline in labor demand; LD’
96 = city governments and enterprises try to maintain higher employment 
artificially.  The shifts in LS
96 , LD
96, and LD’
96 would normally differ among the cities.  The location of the 
cities on the diagram assumes that these shifts are similar.  The rate of unemployment is notionally the 
difference between the LS
96 curve and the location of the city on its left, as measured by the horizontal axis. 
 
 
99.       The two extreme cases are Samara (Sr) and Ul’yanovsk (Ul).   Samara had a relatively 
moderate decline in wages, but the highest recorded decline in employment.   Relatively low 
wage arrears support the premise that employment here absorbed the burden of labor-market 
adjustment.   Ul’yanovsk, on the other hand, strongly protected the level of employment but 
had to allow real wages to drop quite sharply.   Ul’yanovsk then cushioned those lower wages 
by price controls, leading to a lower cost of minimum subsistence.  Unemployment was kept 
low, but a relatively high level of wage arrears suggests the artificial nature of some of the 
employment.  Among the other cities, Tver’ (Tv) stands out as having the lowest decline in 
real wages, only a modest decline in employment, low official unemployment, and low wage 
arrears.  Kazan’ (Kz) is not far behind Tver’, but the high level of wage arrears in Tatarstan 
suggests that employment in the city was maintained artificially.  The other city managing to 
retain a high level of employment was Volgograd (Vg), combining a moderate decline in 
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Cheboksary (Ch) and Yaroslavl’ (Yr) experienced large losses in employment, but with a 
smaller decline in wages.  In both cases, official unemployment was relatively high and wage 
arrears significant.  
100.     Social outcomes.  We now direct our attention to the real social wage and income 
distribution.  Additional indicators of social outcomes exist (e.g., de Melo and Ofer, 1999, 
Appendix Table 14), but information on them is sporadic.  The social outcomes in Volga 
capitals are ranked in Table 14 
 
Table 14. Comparison of Initial Conditions and Policy Reform Ratings with Socio-
economic Outcome in Regional Capitals a/ 
Source: Tables 8, 11 and 12. 
a/ 3=above average; 2=average; 1=below average 
 
 
101.     Real social wage.  The average monthly wage divided by the cost of minimum 
subsistence is the best available measure of the living standard of the poor, and is referred to 
here as the “real social wage.” As is apparent in Table 13 and Figure 3, the ranking of cities 
by this measure differs from the ranking according to the real economic wage.  In particular, 
Ul’yanovsk, which has the lowest real economic wage, has slightly above average real social 
wages.  And Tver’, with the highest real economic wage, has only a moderately high real 
social wage.  Saratov has by far the lowest real social wage, combining a situation of low 
economic wages with substantial price liberalization.  In fact, Saratov suffers wide income 
disparities, with a large percentage of the population receiving less than the subsistence 
minimum.  Conversely, Yaroslavl’, Nizhniy Novgorod, and especially Ul’yanovsk have 






Tver 3 3 3 2
Yaroslavl 3 3 2 2
Nizhni Novgorod 2 3 2 2
Cheboksary 1 1 2 1
Kazan 3 2 3 3
Ulyanovsk 1 1 1 2
Samara 3 3 3 3
Saratov 3 2 2 1
Volgograd 3 3 2 2






Socioeconomic Outcome, 1997  - 48 - 
102.     Income distribution.  Increasing inequality in the distribution of income is a well-
recognized consequence of transition.  It has been observed in Central and Eastern Europe as 
well as the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union.  In the Russian Federation, 
inequality was already at OECD levels in the late 1980s and had increased to the (higher) 
level of middle-income countries by 1993.
50  Typically, higher levels of inequality reflect 
increases in unemployment and in wage dispersion; growing regional disparities; and higher 
income from rent and profits, which are less equally distributed than are wages.  The Volga 
data provide evidence of increasing inequality both within and among the cities (see 
Appendix Table 14 of de Melo and Ofer, 1999).  Per capita sales of consumer goods have 
declined strongly in all cities covered here except Kazan’, while telephones and cars per 
1,000 residents have increased substantially.  This suggests that although the purchasing 
power of the average citizen is declining, the purchasing power of wealthier households is 
increasing.  The most extreme example appears to be Tver’, where consumer goods sales fell 
by 39 percent, while the rate of car ownership more than doubled. 
D.   Interactions among Initial Conditions, Policies, and Outcomes and What Matters 
 
103.     As discussed above, there are no comprehensive indicators of growth at the city level, 
and employment data may be interpreted in more than one way.  Data on most social 
indicators at the level of individual cities are partial at best.  Therefore we use the real 
economic wage and the real social wage as indicators of socioeconomic outcomes in the 
cities, despite their limitations.
51  They are shown in Table 14 along with the summary 
indicators for initial conditions and policy reform.  The following observations on the 
interaction between initial conditions, policy reform, and social and economic outcomes are 
based on two and three-way cross-tabulations of the Volga capitals’ ranks on these 
indicators.
52  We characterize these observations as hypotheses rather than conclusions. 
104.     Initial conditions and policy reform.  Rankings on initial conditions and policy 
reform are the same for most Volga capitals.  As exceptions, Nizhniy Novgorod ranks higher 
on policy reform than on initial conditions, and Kazan and Saratov rank lower on policy 
reform than on initial conditions; but the only real outlier is Astrakhan', which has the highest 
rank on initial conditions but the lowest rank on policy reform. Initial conditions were 
particularly poor in Cheboksary and Ul’yanovsk and policy reform has been slow in both 
cities, suggesting that relatively poor prospects caused local leaders to be more cautious 
toward reform. In Samara, Yaroslavl’, Volgograd and Tver’, initial conditions were favorable 
and policy reform has been relatively strong.  The apparent positive relationship between 
initial conditions and reform suggests that initial conditions are important for both the speed 
                                                 
50 See Figure 4.1 of World Bank (1996). 
51 A rank of above average is given to wages 10 percent or more above the average, and a 
rank of below average is given to wages 10 percent or more below the average.  
52 The small size of our sample precludes the use of more rigorous statistical analysis.   - 49 - 
and success of economic reforms at the municipal level, just as they are at the macro level.
53  
To summarize the evidence from the two-way cross-tabulations, both cities with below-
average rank on initial conditions have below average rank on policy reform, but above-
average rank on initial conditions does not guarantee above-average rank on policy reform. 
Thus, whereas less endowed cities may see fast reform as an experiment they can ill afford, 
their better-off peers do not necessarily choose the fast lane themselves. 
105.     Initial conditions and social and economic outcomes.  None of the cities with 
below-average ranks on initial conditions has above-average rank on either social or 
economic outcome. Above-average rank on initial conditions however does not guarantee 
above-average rank on social or economic outcomes. Thus, whereas a less favorable starting 
position seems to preclude the achievement of above-average social or economic outcomes, 
early favorites at the start of transition end-up with mixed social and economic outcomes. 
106.     Policy reform and social and economic outcomes.  None of the cities with above-
average ranks on policy reform has below-average rank on social or economic outcomes. 
None of the cities with below-average policy reform ranks has above-average ranks on social 
or economic outcomes. Thus, the implementation of faster and deeper reforms prevents the 
worst-case scenario in social and economic outcomes, whereas the more conservative 
approach to reforms robs the cities of the opportunity to achieve above-average social and 
economic outcomes.  From a political perspective, it is of some interest that none of the Red 
Belt cities has an above-average rank on either social or economic outcome, despite the fact 
that  Volgograd has an above-average rank on policy reform and Saratov has an average rank 
on policy reform. 
107.     Initial conditions, policies, and outcomes. The three-way cross-tabulation of Volga 
cities’ ranks suggests that fast and deep reforms preclude the worst case scenario, but this 
observation begs the fact that the leadership in initially less-endowed cities feels it can not 
afford this course of action.  It also suggests three different cases of interaction among initial 
conditions, policies and outcomes. 
108.     Saratov epitomizes the first case, where socioeconomic outcomes are worse than one 
might expect given initial conditions and policy reforms.  Saratov’s poor performance 
appears to result from weak leadership and poor governance prior to Ayatskov, and from a 
policy favoring agriculture over industry.  But Yaroslavl’ and possibly Volgograd also fall 
into this category, and other factors may explain the disparity between reforms and outcomes.  
One explanation is a possible time lag between the initiation of reform and rising real 
economic wages.  Another explanation is that in reformist regions, with a more developed 
private sector, wages are likely to contribute less to total household incomes than in the 
conservative regions.  Thus outcomes measured by wages alone may be understated. 
                                                 
53 See de Melo et al.(1997) for evidence at the macro level.   - 50 - 
109.     Ul’yanovsk epitomizes the second case, where social, if not economic, outcomes are 
better than one might expect, given initial conditions and reform.  Kazan’ also belongs to this 
group.   This case suggests that delaying reforms may help to arrest production declines, or 
that some “reforms” may be better than others.  Ul’yanovsk’s efforts to protect consumers by 
delaying price liberalization for basic foods and municipal services appear to have been 
successful through 1996.  Despite having the lowest economic wage, Ul’yanovsk’s social 
wage was one of the highest at this point.  Judging from the limited time horizon of this 
study, it would appear that higher living standards for low-income groups can in fact be 
achieved by price controls, particularly when those controls are increasingly limited to 
subsistence items and efforts are made to target or otherwise prevent overconsumption.   
Kazan’s success relative to its initial conditions and reform record is more easily understood.   
It has extracted large concessions from the center in terms of high tax retention and fiscal 
transfers.  It has a more favorable endowment in natural resources and has attracted foreign 
investment.   It has maintained relatively stable real wages and employment and has good 
relations with the center.  
110.     The third case includes the other five cities that have performed more or less as 
expected.  Samara and Tver’ score relatively well on socioeconomic outcomes as well as on 
initial conditions and reforms.  Cheboksary and Astrakhan’, on the other hand, score poorly 
on most indicators, and Nizhniy Novgorod occupies an intermediate position.  These 
examples appear to highlight the fact Red Belt cities typically have lagged in reforms and 
have experienced less successful economic outcomes. 
111.     What matters.  Aside from these general relationships, the comparison of the 
experience of the Volga cities highlights the following points. 
112.     Resources.  Kazan' benefits from the fact that, among the 10 Volga regions, only 
Tatarstan is a significant oil producer at the national level (e.g. see Sagers 1996, p. 567), 
accounting for some 7 to 8 percent of national output. Moreover, Kazan’ clearly has benefited 
enormously from Tatarstan’s unique arrangements with the federal government. Tatarstan has 
a bilateral agreement with the Federal government that includes special “single-channel” tax 
arrangements; during 1994–1996 it paid to the center an average of only 20 percent of 
regionally collected taxes, whereas the Russia-wide average was 40 percent.   The republic 
also was the largest recipient of federal transfers during the first nine months of 1997 and 
benefited particularly from political transfers associated with property deals, special 
agreements, and targeted programs.   Other regions received smaller transfers, primarily from 
the Fund for Financial Support of the Regions, an equalization fund that accounts for about 
half of all federal transfers.  In 1996, Saratov was one of the 10 largest recipients of FFSR 
transfers (MFK Renaissance, 1998a), which may partially account for its improved economic 
performance in 1997. 
113.     Other cities and regions may have been less successful in attracting transfers from the 
center, but actions reflect an awareness of how much financial resources matter.  In 
November 1996, Volgograd mayor Yuriy Chekhov sued the federal government for 200 
billion rubles ($37 million) owed to the city for wages, pensions, and social programs.     - 51 - 
Samara is currently working on an agreement to exchange federal debt to the region for 
regional shares in the federally owned airport.  Most cities are making major efforts to attract 
foreign investment and payments from federal and regional authorities to help restructure the 
largest enterprises.  The ability of Boris Nemtsov to arrange for federal assistance for the 
GAZ car factory has made a significant difference in the local economy of Nizhniy 
Novgorod.  
114.     Strong government.  This hypothesis is not as obvious as it sounds.  At the beginning 
of transition, some observers
54 believed that the market economy and hence growth would 
flourish best where government was weak or absent, or at least did not intervene, since the 
control instinct of any post-communist government would stifle competition.  The model of 
decentralized decision making by economic agents in this scenario did not require 
cooperation, much less bartering and bargaining services, to produce an orderly flow of 
products and factors of production.   
115.     The reality appears to be different, as strong leadership at the local level seems to 
have paid off.  Weak leadership has not.  This may partly reflect the fact that regional policies 
are typically more conservative and prevail where local leadership is weak.  It may also be 
that without strong unified leadership at the local level, the regions win out over local 
authorities in the competition for resources.  Uncertain alliances characterized politics at the 
local level in Saratov and Ul’yanovsk prior to 1996, and city councils in Yaroslavl’, Tver’, 
and Nizhniy Novgorod consist of small interest groups who make governance difficult.   
Most of these cities have performed less well than expected.  The most obvious example of 
weak government is Saratov.  The governors prior to Ayatskov, elected at the end of 1996, 
were poor leaders, as were the mayors.  The city’s fiscal position is poor, with a low share of 
cash revenues at the city level, low cost recovery on housing and utilities, and high fiscal 
deficits. 
116.      Time lags.  Yaroslavl’, a city with favorable initial conditions and the highest ranking 
on reform, had only a moderate-ranking real economic wage after six years of transition.  At 
the same time, the slowest reformers—namely Ul’yanovsk, Cheboksary, and Astrakhan’—
did better than their reform record would indicate if reform were positively associated with 
favorable socioeconomic outcomes.  Ul’yanovsk is a region where the oblast government 
attempted to maintain enterprise production and employment despite low profitability.  As a 
result, it had one of the lowest declines in industrial production in Russia through 1993, 
although quite significant declines occurred in 1994–1996. 
117.     One explanation for these anomalies is the time lag between outcomes and reform 
shown at the macroeconomic level in de Melo et al. (1996, 1997) . If it is true, for example, 
                                                 
54 These included Yegor Gaidar, Jeffrey Sachs, and Anders Åslund, among others.  Åslund 
(1992, p. 22), for example, noted: “The suggestion that follows from this argument [of 
deficiencies of the state] is that the former Communist countries need to shift to extremely 
liberal economies in a radical deregulation.”   - 52 - 
that the successful adaptation of defense industries is rare, the hard budget constraint on 
Saratov’s defense industries may have resulted in large early declines in production, releasing 
the resources needed to promote a strong subsequent recovery. Reforms would not show up 
in better economic outcomes until sometime in the future.  This same logic would imply that 
production declines in Ul’yanovsk will continue in the future even if industry elsewhere picks 
up.  It is too soon to comment definitively on such scenarios. 
118.     Red Belt, with some exceptions:   Red Belt cities all ranked low on the socioeconomic 
outcomes indicator, whereas non–Red Belt cities ranked high.  This occurred despite the fact 
that one Red Belt city, Astrakhan’, appeared initially to have quite favorable prospects, 
whereas one non-Red Belt city, Nizhniy Novgorod, did not.  These outcomes likely result in 
part from slower reform in the Red Belt on average.   Three of the Red Belt cities--
Ul’yanovsk, Cheboksary, and Astrakhan’--have clearly lagged on reforms.  But there is 
diversity within the Red Belt group.  Volgograd Oblast under Governor Ivan Shabunin and 
more recently, Saratov Oblast under Dmitriy Ayatskov, have broken out of the traditionalist 
mold, with more progressive reform profiles similar to those of Nizhniy Novgorod and 
Kazan’.  But the “stick” of a hard budget constraint in Saratov has not been balanced by the 
“carrot” of institution building.  In the recent business survey in six Volga cities conducted by 
the authors, Saratov received the lowest ranking on business environment and municipal 
services. 
119.     Furthermore, some non–Red Belt cities, such as Kazan’,  may have moved more 
slowly on reforms than expected.  Kazan’s high income and access to resources allowed it to 
pursue a wide variety of objectives, including a more socially oriented “development with a 
human face.”  Somewhat surprising is the absence of Nizhniy Novgorod from the very top 
rank on policy reform, as political leaders there projected a strong reformist image during the 
early days of transition. 
120.     Spillover effects.  It may be that Moscow’s proximity to Tver’ provides a spillover 
effect for firms in the latter city.  These spillover effects might not only permit economies of 
scale; they might also provide an impetus for innovation and the spread of knowledge.   
Spillover effects also appear to emanate from four adjoining regions in the middle Volga--
Tatarstan, Samara, Saratov, and Volgograd.  They are supporting pro-reform politicians and 
attracting foreign investment.   Saratov is an unlikely setting for a reform candidate, as it has 
traditionally been a closed city and formed part of the Red Belt.  But in November 1997, 
Governor Ayatskov pushed through a path-breaking bill that explicitly allows the purchase 
and sale of land within the region by any Russian citizen (MFK Renaissance, 1998c).  It is 
tempting to speculate that Saratov has been influenced by the proximity of reformist Samara. 
121.     Part of Samara Oblast’s success may reflect the high urbanization rate and the unusual 
conglomeration of two large, neighboring cities—Samara and Togliatti.  But “growth poles” 
can exert negative (centrifugal) as well as positive spillover effects, especially over the short 
run.  For example, Samara appears to have lost out to Togliatti in the competition for regional 
leadership, with the result that local and foreign resources have been focused more on the 
latter city and Samara has performed less well than might be expected.  Togliatti, a city of   - 53 - 
720,000 people, has a youthful population and experienced a 6 percent plus increase in 
industrial production in 1996.  At that  time, the average monthly wage in Togliatti was 50 
percent higher than for Samara Oblast as a whole.
55   
122.     City size.  With the exception of Tver’, economic outcomes appear to be more 
favorable in the larger cities than in the smaller ones.  Like Tver’, Yaroslavl’ has been an 
active reformer, but results are disappointing.  The other three smaller cities— Ul’yanovsk, 
Cheboksary, and Astrakhan’—have the lowest real economic wage.  If small size is a 
disadvantage, it could be another reason why these cities have been more cautious on 
reforms.  One explanation for less success would be that, compared to larger cities, smaller 
cities do not have as much political influence, and hence claim on resources, at either the 
regional or federal level.  Another explanation would be the lower industrial diversity typical 
of small cities. 
123.     Closed cities.  Of the four formerly closed cities (Nizhniy Novgorod, Samara, 
Saratov, and Volgograd), only Samara has a reputation for having an active free press and 
freely available information.  
124.     So the factors listed above appear to have exerted an influence.  Conversely,  some 
factors appear not to have mattered much. 
125.     Natural resources.  The energy sector did attract some foreign investment in Kazan’ 
and Samara, and to a lesser extent in Saratov and Volgograd.   But, with the possible 
exception of Kazan, it did not appear to be a determining factor in overall foreign investment, 
much less general economic performance.  This reflects in part the difficulties encountered in 
Astrakhan' and the relative decline in the importance of the Volga resources compared to 
those developed elsewhere (i.e. West Siberia).  Also, with the exception of Tver’, the cities in 
strong agricultural regions appear to have suffered, possibly from agriculture’s ineffective 
competition for scarce resources. 
126.     Defense industry.  We initially took a neutral position regarding the influence of the 
defense industry on outcomes.   Further analysis does not shed much light on this question.  
Leaving aside Kazan’, because of its better overall access to federal transfer funds, the 
experiences of Nizhniy Novgorod, Samara, and Saratov suggest that these cities have not 
necessarily benefited from a previously high level of defense-industry output.  On the other 
hand, they may not have suffered either, since the large size of these cities resulted in a 
relatively high level of industrial diversity despite the concentration of defense-industry 
enterprises.
56   
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 This is based on statistics from the “Togliatti in Business” city web page [www.tlt.ru] for 
November 20, 1998.  
56 Glaeser et al. (1992) have provided evidence for the importance of industrial diversity 
based on the study of U.S. cities.   Industrial diversity promotes growth, as knowledge spills   - 54 - 
127.     Developments in 1997 and 1998.   The time between the end of 1996 and mid-1998 
represented a period of “virtual stability” and hopes for resumed growth in Russia.  These 
hopes were dashed at least temporarily by the August 1998 financial crisis, but warning signs 
were on the horizon even earlier.  Foreign direct investment had been increasing, but flows of 
financial capital dominated, as high interest rates discouraged real investment.  Barter 
transactions and the use of other money surrogates increased and arrears proliferated.   
128.     Production.  Nonetheless, several cities (Saratov, Cheboksary, and some industries in 
Yaroslavl’) experienced for the first time since 1990 a small increase in industrial production 
in 1997.  These increases were accompanied by declines in unemployment, explained in part 
by a continued decline in the size of the labor force.
57   However, by late 1998, even though 
firms were asked to respond on the basis for their financial situation before the August crisis, 
the authors' survey of small textile enterprises in six Volga cities  showed more firms losing 
money than making profits.  Declines relative to 1997 levels also were reported by these 
firms in labor productivity and employment. 
129.     Foreign investment.  In 1997, foreign direct investment to Russia increased relative to 
1996, but among the Volga regions rose only in Samara Oblast (from $9 to $18 per capita), 
which ranked fourth among all Russian regions in FDI.  An evaluation of investment risk in 
Russia’s (89) regions in 1998 ranked Samara fifth, Nizhniy Novgorod sixth, Tatarstan 
eleventh, and Saratov twenty-first (e.g., see Carana Company, 1998). 
130.     Prices.  Goskomstat Rossii data for 1997 show that the disparity in the cost of 25 
basic food items narrowed among the 10 Volga capitals, with the lowest average costs 
continuing to be found in Ul’yanovsk, Cheboksary, and Kazan’.  The disparity in the cost of 
minimum subsistence narrowed as well.  Saratov was the only city where neither of these 
costs increased in current rubles, so its relative position on both the real economic wage and 
the real social wage has improved.   Price controls still exist for certain commodities.
58  
                                                                                                                                                       
over industry groups and stimulates new ideas and innovations.  In other words, competition 
and inter-industry, rather than intra-industry, knowledge spillovers were determined to be 
important for growth. 
57 Interestingly, 1997 data on registered unemployment show that the only two regions 
experiencing an increase in registered unemployment were Samara Oblast and Tatarstan, 
otherwise the most successful regions economically (see Appendix Table 12 in de Melo and 
Ofer, 1999). 
58 For example, in the aforementioned survey in six Volga capitals in late 1998, 40 percent of 
the clothing and textile firms reported that their output was still subject to price controls, with 
firms in Astrakhan' and Samara recording the most complaints.  Most controls were product 
specific, but some firms reported controls on retail margins.   - 55 - 
131.     Incomes and wages.  Disparity in real incomes clearly increased among the Volga 
regions, and presumably the capitals, in 1997.
59  Conversely, the disparity in real economic 
wages appears to have moderated somewhat, as the largest increases in 1997 were in three of 
the five capital cities (Chuvashia, Astrakhan’, and Saratov) with the lowest real economic 
wage in 1996. 
132.     Fiscal conditions.  The years 1997 and 1998 were the first two in which elected 
mayors and city councils were everywhere in place and fiscal relationships with the federal 
level were put in better formal order.  In particular, the tax shares and transfers accruing to 
cities became more predictable.  All cities in this study for which 1996–1998 budgetary 
information is available managed to increase the “own-taxes” share and thus to offset 
declines in shared taxes and transfers from upper-level governments.  Of the three cities for 
which complete 1998 budgets are available (Nizhniy Novgorod, Saratov, and Yaroslavl’), the 
situation in Saratov appeared the worse by 1998, with budget expenditures dropping to 63 
percent of the 1996 level.
60 
133.     Reforms.    The rate of reform at the city level appears to have decelerated, with the 
exception of some continued movement away from price controls and toward more “own-
share” tax revenue collection.  Privatization of small enterprises had more or less run its 
course, and the number of newly established private enterprises, and small enterprises more 
generally, declined in some cities.  Housing reform (including privatization and reduced rent 
and utilities subsidization) appears to have slowed down, in particular.
61  Only one region 
among the 10 covered here (Samara Oblast) achieved housing cost-sharing of more than 50 
percent by 1998, with three more (Tver’, Chuvashia, and Volgograd) managing 35 percent or 
higher. 
VI.   CONCLUSIONS 
 
134.     A number of more general observations on Russian transition emerge from this paper.  
As demonstrated above,  all Volga capitals had many characteristics in common at the 
beginning of transition and also shared in many respects similar challenges and experiences 
stemming from the abolition of central planning and fairly rapid economic and political 
decentralization. City governments, for example, not only now administer a much larger 
share of the consolidated general government budget of the Russian Federation than in the 
                                                 
59 For example, in Samara Oblast real per capita income grew by 73 percent, compared to 
only 19 percent in Chuvashia, over an 18-month period (see Appendix Table 2 in de Melo 
and Ofer, 1999).   
60 Only 43 percent of revenues were in cash by this time. 
61  In the 1998 city budgets of Yaroslavl’, Nizhniy Novgorod, and Saratov, expenditures on 
housing and utilities ranged from one-third to 40 percent of total expenditures, up from 
previous levels.   - 56 - 
early 1990s, but fiscal decentralization has by its nature given city officials new 
responsibilities and more powers. 
135.     This decentralization, which has occurred in Russia at both the federal and sub-
national levels, reflects a mix of political and economic factors.  In focusing on the 
devolution of budgetary powers to the Volga cities by regional governments, we find a strong 
association between the level of decentralization and the decline in regional industrial 
production, which was located primarily in the cities.  In part, fiscal decentralization was 
used to help compensate cities for the rapid erosion of the local economy.  Political factors 
also played a role, however, and less extensive decentralization was associated with the two 
republics of Tatarstan and Chuvashia and the oblasts of the Red Belt.  In both cases, regional 
leadership was more comfortable with more centralized fiscal arrangements.  This more 
centralized model, characterized by higher transfers substituting for less extensive revenue 
decentralization, is associated with weak policy reform in the capital cities, presumably due 
to less freedom in policy formulation and lower incentives to provide better services in 
anticipation of higher tax receipts. 
136.     With one exception, we found that the level of real per capita expenditures on 
subsidies and public goods in city budgets was positively associated with regional real 
income level.  Social protection represented the exception, as it exhibited a small negative 
relationship with income level.  But social protection is higher in cities with above average 
ranks on market reforms, suggesting that officials there are conscious of providing a better 
safety net for those adversely affected.  Education expenditure tended to be higher in the two 
republics and lower in Red Belt cities and remained more or less constant over time, unlike 
health and national economy expenditures that recorded a negative trend over time.  
137.     The dominance of housing in the budgets of all cities is striking.  Housing  not only 
represents the single largest subsidy; it is also the single largest budgetary expenditure.  There 
are many obstacles to increasing cost recovery in housing provision, including a low starting 
point and the low real incomes of much of the population. Further privatization and 
development of an urban land market will be necessary for housing to be moved from the 
expenditure to the revenue side of the budget. 
138.     All Volga capitals had large firms employing thousands of people, mostly managed 
by the federal government. Some firms were privatized, and some remained under state (non-
municipal) ownership.  But privatization did not bring success or even necessarily good 
management.  Moreover, regardless of ownership, all large enterprises were affected, mostly 
for the worse, by increasing competition accompanying market reforms at the national level.  
Many were assisted by regional and local officials attempting to protect output and 
employment levels. Evidence on individual enterprises suggests that interventions of local 
politicians were important and often determined the fate of the enterprise. 
139.     Even cities such as Samara—that seem to have had good leadership, an excellent 
geographical position, and a highly skilled workforce—are struggling to make the transition. 
The main obstacles faced by private enterprises appear to be factors that could be influenced,   - 57 - 
if not totally controlled, by city governments.  These obstacles include continued price 
controls, heavy taxation, poor municipal services (especially public and property safety, 
settlement of legal disputes, and street maintenance and lighting), and 
corruption/inefficiency.  Those interviewed at many firms indicated that even if local 
governments had insufficient resources to provide meaningful direct support, they could still 
encourage small and medium-sized enterprises by creating a stable and fair legal and 
regulatory environment, by providing adequate municipal services, and by not otherwise 
interfering.
62 
140.     One initially surprising finding is the infrequency of payments for protection or 
private law enforcement and low reported reliance on private Mafia-type groups, using 
threats or violence, as intermediaries in dealing with government officials and regulators.  
This finding is, however, consistent with the findings of Hendley et al (1998), based on a 
much larger survey, that firms typically rely on enterprise-to-enterprise negotiations and 
public courts to settle disputes.  They found little evidence to suggest that enterprises resort to 
organized criminal groups for contract enforcement; only 3 percent of the surveyed firms 
reported that they used such groups to prevent or resolve problems with suppliers or to 
investigate their customers’ ability to pay.  
141.      Despite the occasional harsh criticisms of local government, representatives of the 
firms in our survey gave city officials a net positive evaluation regarding their attitude toward 
private business, which was perceived to be better than the attitudes of the regional 
government or the general public.  This undoubtedly reflects the fact that city officials see 
their own self-interest in the success of the local economy.  The pros and cons of protecting 
industry may have been debated at the federal level, but at the local level city governments do 
not hesitate to fight for the survival of their local industries on all fronts.
63  Not only will city 
leaders’ efforts largely determine the revenue base for city budgets, but also the large share of 
workers participating in the private sector, together with their dependents, may well 
constitute the majority for future elections. 
142.     Notwithstanding the many similarities at the onset of transition, and the radical 
changes that have occurred in the institutions and economies in all 10 Volga capitals, 
differing local responses to common problems have resulted in increasing disparities in 
prices, wages, and levels of industrial production.  The cities have become increasingly 
differentiated both among themselves and in comparison with their surrounding regions.  To 
some extent this diversity reflects the diversity in the central government’s relations with 
regions; it arises from its lack of resolve and ability to treat them equitably, and to some 
extent it is the outcome of differing policies  adopted at the regional and local levels.  As has 
                                                 
62 Frye and Shleifer (1997) have presented additional evidence that local government 
relations with new private businesses make an important difference to their success. 
63 A notable exception in recent years, as noted above,  is Saratov Oblast, where Governor 
Ayatskov has supported a hard budget constraint for industry.   - 58 - 
been shown, for example, most northern cities adopted policies more consistent with the 
central government’s support of free market reforms, whereas most southern, Red Belt, cities 
pursued more cautious and protective policies. 
143.     Most Volga capitals had rather similar prospects for adjustment to the transition, 
however cities with  less favorable prospects appear to have been particularly cautious on 
reform, raising the possibility that local leaders believed they could ill afford 
experimentation.  Furthermore, cities lagging in economic reforms experienced only poor or 
modest socioeconomic outcomes and none of the fast reformers had poor outcomes, 
suggesting that faster reform precludes the worst case scenario on socioeconomic outcomes.  
For the slower reformers, efforts to protect consumers through targeting and price controls on 
subsistence items seem to have had some success in protecting real social wages.  
144.     These differences in approach reflect basic questions and continued uncertainties.  
Were the right social and industrial policies pursued during the early years of the reform?  
The apparent time lag between policies and outcomes over the short term makes it difficult to 
judge, but one cannot avoid doubting the conventional wisdom that a more “humanistic” and 
interventionist economic approach was misguided.   Is it possible that the partial shield 
provided by many local governments against radical changes helped Russia weather an 
extremely difficult period?    
145.     The answer to this question is of more than passing interest.  With the credibility of 
the federal government in Russia at an all-time low,  foreign investors and others involved in 
the Russian economy will have no choice but to rely on the competence and reliability of 
local leaders, especially mayors and governors.  They will be seeking evidence of 
accountability in the form of the rule of law and evidence of transparency in the form of 
reliable public information.   Yet information at the city level in Russia is neither easily 
accessible nor always available.  In developed countries, publicly available statistics used to 
assess the business environment at the local level include information on municipal 
employment; planned and actual city budgets and any extrabudgetary funds; municipal 
services such as public transport, police and fire protection, and garbage collection; social 
statistics on education, health, and crime; data on air and water pollution levels; information 
on the organization and composition of city courts; business statistics on firm ownership, 
activities, and number of employees; tourism data; and information on public construction 
projects (such as roads and housing).  The availability of good information of this type will 
encourage local and other researchers to monitor conditions, make it possible to document 
progress and/or ensure accountability of local officials, help diagnose significant problems, 
and identify important issues for public policy debate and political decisions.  In this study 
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APPENDIX TABLES 
 
Appendix Table 1. Fiscal Role of Municipalities in the Russian Federation 
(percentage, in each category, of consolidated general government) 
 
Source: Freinkman, Treisman and Titov 1998 and authors’ estimates. 
 
a/ The share of consolidated general government expenditures in GDP is not  
equal to the sum of the individual shares of its tiers, because of the netting out 
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Appendix Table 2. Fiscal Decentralization and Subordination in Cities under Regional Jurisdiction, within 
Regions, and on Federal Level 
(%) 
Source: Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation and authors calculations. 
 
a/ Data for the Russian Federation is a weighted average of regional data, excluding St. Petersburg and Moscow Regions, which have a 
dual status of “region-municipality”. 
b/ 1993 data for the two measures of fiscal decentralization in CRJs. 
c/ Unless otherwise noted, total revenues and expenditures are calculated on net transfer basis. Total revenues on net transfer basis 
equal the sum of tax and non-tax revenues plus the net transfers from higher levels of government. To obtain the value of total 
revenues on net transfer basis from the standard reporting forms filed with the Ministry of Finance, we take the gross budget revenues 
and subtract (1) expenditures on transfers to higher levels of government, and (2) revenues from transfers from lower levels of 
government. Total expenditures on net transfer basis equal the sum of itemized expenditures plus the net transfers to lower levels of 
government. To obtain the value of total expenditures on net transfer basis from the standard reporting forms filed with the Ministry 
of Finance, we take the gross budget expenditures and subtract (1) revenues from transfers from lower levels of government, and (2) 
expenditures on transfers to higher levels of government. Net regional transfers to local governments are calculated as the difference 
between local governments revenues from transfers from the regional administration and local governments expenditures on transfers 
to the regional administration. 
d/ Total revenues and expenditures exclude horizontal transfers within the respective government tier, and consolidated regional and 
general government budget revenues and expenditures exclude vertical transfers within their jurisdictions. Net federal transfers to 
regions are calculated as the difference between the regional revenues from transfers from the federal government and the regional 
expenditures on transfers to the federal government. 
1992 1995 1996 1997 1992 b/ 1995 1996 1997
I.  In CRJs c/
1. Ratio of per capita total revenues of local governments in CRJs 
and consolidated regional government 66 71 76 69 70 N/A N/A N/A
2. Ratio of per capita total expenditures of local governments in 
CRJs and consolidated regional government 67 68 67 65 68 N/A N/A N/A
3. Ratio between net regional transfers to local governments in 
CRJs and their total expenditures including transfers to regions 15 14 16 15 15 17 19 21
II. Within regions d/
1. Ratio between local governments total revenues and 
consolidated regional budget revenues 68 69 71 66 68 70 73 70
2. Ratio between local governments total expenditures before 
transfers and consolidated regional budget expenditures 66 66 66 63 65 68 69 66
3. Ratio between regional transfers to local governments and local 
governments total expenditures icluding transfers to regions 30 27 29 26 25 29 31 30
III On federal level d/
1. Ratio between consolidated regional budget revenues and 
consolidated general government budget revenues - - - - 4 3 5 45 56 1
2. Ratio between consolidated regional budget expenditures before 
transfers and consolidated general government budget 
expenditures
- - - - 2 5 4 84 55 5
3. Ratio between net federal transfers to regions and consolidated 
regional total expenditures including transfers to the federal 
governement
3 8 14 13 7 13 17 15
  Russian Federation a/   Average in Volga Regions
Measures of Fiscal Decentralization and Subordination- 66 - 
Appendix Table 3. Fiscal Decentralization and Subordination in Cities under Regional 
Jurisdiction a/, 1992 - 1997 
 
(%) 
Source: Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation and authors calculations. 
 
a/ Unless otherwise noted, total revenues and expenditures are calculated on net transfer basis (see notes to Appendix Table 
2). 
b/ Data for the Russian Federation is a weighted average of regional data, excluding St. Petersburg and Moscow Regions, 
which have a dual status of “region-municipality”. 
1992 1994 1996 1992 1994 1996 1992 1994 1996
  Tver 71 73 76 79 75 75 81 73 14 13 14 24
  Y a r o s l a v l 7 98 47 96 8 7 98 56 56 5 5 91 31 3
  N i z h n i  N o v g o r o d 6 88 49 18 8 6 98 48 08 0 91 51 11 1
  C h u v a s h i a 5 56 27 68 3 5 56 26 38 1 62 42 03 7
  T a t a r s t a n 5 15 65 73 5 5 15 55 03 7 1 51 31 71 6
  U l y a n o v s k 5 55 66 55 5 5 55 54 84 9 2 12 3 7 8
  Samara 62 70 81 71 61 70 74 72 13 7 5 9
  S a r a t o v 7 16 67 96 3 7 76 77 45 5 1 42 51 31 2
  V o l g o g r a d 8 37 58 07 8 7 97 57 27 8 1 2 81 1 7
  A s t r a k h a n 7 05 57 76 6 6 85 36 56 0 4 43 94 81 9
  Memo Item
  Average in Volga Regions 66 68 76 69 67 68 67 65 15 18 16 15
  Russian Federation b/ N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 15 23 19 21
Ratio of per capita total 
revenues of CRJs and 
consolidated regional 
governments
Ratio of per capita total 
expenditures of CRJs and 
consolidated regional 
governments
Net Regional Transfers as 
Percent of CRJs Total 
Expenditures Including 
Transfers to Regions
Regions / Measures of Fiscal 
Decentralization and 
Subordination in CRJs
1997 1997 1997- 67 - 
Appendix Table 4. Structure of Local Governments’ Budgets in CRJs, 1992 and 1997 
(Shares of total) 
Source: Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation and authors calculations. 
 
a/ Data for the Russian Federation is weighted averages of CRJs and consolidated regional data, excluding St. 
Petersburg and Moscow. 
b/ Own Revenues equal the sum of revenues from the Property Tax, Other Taxes and Non-Tax Revenues. 
Russian Federation a/
CRJ Region
1992 1997 1992 1997 1992 1997
I . T o t a l  R e v e n u e s 11 11 11
1. Net Transfers from Higher Levels of 
Government 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.22 0.07 0.17
2. Total Tax Revenues 0.83 0.79 0.83 0.75 0.82 0.74
  Profit Tax 0.35 0.12 0.36 0.12 0.33 0.14
  Personal Income Tax 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.16 0.16
  VAT 0.15 0.10 0.13 0.09 0.19 0.12
  Excise Taxes 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.03
  Property Taxes 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.11
  Natural Resources Tax 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.08
  Other Taxes 0.06 0.17 0.05 0.14 0.04 0.10
3. Non-Tax Revenues 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.09
II. Total Expenditures 1 1 1 1 1 1
1. Net Transfers to Lower Levels of 
Government 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
2. Administration and Justice 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.07
3. National Economy 0.45 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.37 0.35
3a. Housing N/A 0.33 N/A 0.34 N/A 0.22
3b. Transport and Communication N/A 0.06 N/A 0.05 N/A 0.04
3c. Industry N/A 0.01 N/A 0.01 N/A 0.05
3d. Agriculture N/A 0.01 N/A 0.01 N/A 0.05
4. Education 0.20 0.24 0.19 0.24 0.18 0.22
5. Social Protection 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.07
6. Health and Sport 0.21 0.17 0.21 0.16 0.17 0.14
7. Culture and Mass Media 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03
8. Other Expenditures 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.17 0.09
9. Loans 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.03
III. Budget Balance as percent of Total 
Expenditures 0.13 -0.06 0.10 -0.04 0.08 -0.09
IV. Ratio between Expenditures on National 
Economy and Expenditures on 
Education and Health and Sports
1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0
V. Real per Capita (1990 Rubles):
  Local Governments Own Revenues b/ 51 115 - - - -
  Total Budget Expenditures 387 396 - - 606 458
  Education 76 96 - - - -
  Health and Sport 77 68 - - - -
  Social Protection 32 4 - - - -
VI. Per Capita Total Budget Expenditures as 
Percent of the Annual Average Money 
Income in Region
25 22 - - 40 27
CRJ Budget Data
Average in 
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Appendix Table 5. Structure of CRJs Budgets in Volga Regions, 1992, 1997 
(Shares of total as shown) 
Source: Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation and authors calculations. 
Tver Yaroslavl Nizhni Novgorod Chuvashia
1992 1997 1992 1997 1992 1997 1992 1997 1992
I. T o t a l  R e v e n u e s 1111 1 11111
1. Net Transfers from Higher Levels of 
Government 0.12 0.25 0.04 0.14 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.38 0.12 0.17
2. Total Tax Revenues 0.77 0.72 0.93 0.83 0.88 0.82 0.91 0.57 0.85 0.73
  Profit Tax 0.20 0.12 0.52 0.17 0.31 0.09 0.26 0.08 0.60 0.20
  Personal Income Tax 0.31 0.16 0.16 0.21 0.28 0.24 0.36 0.20 0.16 0.21
  VAT 0.16 0.11 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.16 0.21 0.08 0.00 0.00
  Excise Taxes 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
  Property Taxes 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.15
  Natural Resources Tax 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.02
  Other Taxes 0.05 0.15 0.04 0.15 0.05 0.18 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.15
3. Non-Tax Revenues 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.10
II. T o t a l  E x p e n d i t u r e s 1111 1 11111
1. Net Transfers to Lower Levels of 
Government 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2. Administration and Justice 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.05
3. National Economy 0.32 0.38 0.53 0.45 0.38 0.40 0.33 0.46 0.48 0.34
3a. Housing N/A 0.31 N/A 0.30 N/A 0.34 N/A 0.43 N/A 0.25
3b. Transport and Communication N/A 0.05 N/A 0.10 N/A 0.05 N/A 0.03 N/A 0.07
3c. Industry N/A 0.01 N/A 0.03 N/A 0.01 N/A 0.00 N/A 0.00
3d. Agriculture N/A 0.01 N/A 0.01 N/A 0.01 N/A 0.00 N/A 0.01
4. Education 0.22 0.24 0.17 0.24 0.19 0.20 0.26 0.25 0.20 0.28
5. Social Protection 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.01
6. Health and Sport 0.21 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.22 0.20 0.25 0.12 0.17 0.25
7. Culture and Mass Media 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
8. Other Expenditures 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.13 0.03 0.10 0.02
9. Loans 0.11 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03
III. Budget Balance 0.13 -0.05 0.15 -0.05 0.18 -0.05 0.03 -0.03 0.22 -0.09
IV. Real per Capita (1990 Rubles):
  Local Governments Own Revenues 73 133 51 101 48 131 32 84 77 165
  Total Budget Expenditures 359 471 574 389 341 461 290 455 553 541
  Education 79 113 100 92 65 91 77 112 110 151
  H e a l t h  a n d  S p o r t 7 65 78 35 3 7 6 9 17 15 69 2 1 3 5
  Social Protection 3 42 6 19 2 25 1 52 1 5
CRJ Budget Data
Tatarstan
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(Appendix Table 5 continued) 
Source: Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation and authors calculations. 
Ulyanovsk Samara Saratov Astrakhan
1992 1997 1992 1997 1992 1997 1992 1997 1992 1997
I. T o t a l  R e v e n u e s 1111111111
1. Net Transfers from Higher Levels of 
Government 0.19 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.07 0.39 0.20
2. Total Tax Revenues 0.77 0.83 0.87 0.88 0.85 0.84 0.87 0.90 0.57 0.75
  Profit Tax 0.24 0.10 0.25 0.08 0.37 0.04 0.55 0.16 0.17 0.12
  Personal Income Tax 0.17 0.14 0.22 0.34 0.27 0.20 0.23 0.35 0.14 0.22
  VAT 0.25 0.11 0.27 0.12 0.10 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.17 0.18
  Excise Taxes 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04
  Property Taxes 0.02 0.20 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.16 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.04
  Natural Resources Tax 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.03
  Other Taxes 0.07 0.22 0.06 0.20 0.05 0.31 0.07 0.16 0.05 0.12
3. Non-Tax Revenues 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05
II. T o t a l  E x p e n d i t u r e s 1111111111
1. Net Transfers to Lower Levels of 
Government -0.05 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.00
2. Administration and Justice 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.05
3. National Economy 0.48 0.42 0.47 0.45 0.43 0.48 0.53 0.31 0.50 0.39
3a. Housing N/A 0.35 N/A 0.35 N/A 0.37 N/A 0.24 N/A 0.36
3b. Transport and Communication N/A 0.07 N/A 0.09 N/A 0.08 N/A 0.05 N/A 0.01
3c. Industry N/A 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 0.01 N/A 0.01 N/A 0.00
3d. Agriculture N/A 0.00 N/A 0.00 N/A 0.03 N/A 0.00 N/A 0.01
4. Education 0.21 0.22 0.17 0.25 0.22 0.19 0.14 0.26 0.21 0.28
5. Social Protection 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.06
6. Health and Sport 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.16 0.23 0.18 0.21 0.16 0.18 0.17
7. Culture and Mass Media 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
8. Other Expenditures 0.10 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.05
9. Loans 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00
III. Budget Balance 0.12 -0.07 0.13 -0.01 0.06 -0.08 0.19 -0.07 0.12 -0.06
IV. Real per Capita (1990 Rubles):
  L o c a l  G o v e r n m e n t s  O w n  R e v e n u e s 4 49 95 8 1 3 62 9 1 5 65 79 13 85 8
  Total Budget Expenditures 283 211 453 461 315 342 381 325 319 302
  Education 60 46 76 117 68 65 54 85 68 83
  H e a l t h  a n d  S p o r t 6 64 49 37 57 36 38 05 35 85 1
  Social Protection 1 15 12 10 3 19 2 30 1 19
CRJ Budget Data
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Appendix Table 6. Group Means of Selected Variables by Policy Reform Rank of Capital Cities in Volga 
Regions, 1992 –1996 
Differences in Means 
Across Groups
The ratio between per capita total revenues on 
net transfer basis of CRJs and consolidated 
regional government (%)
9.65                   
(0.01)
6.24                  
(0.00)
  - below average rank 60 56 57 63 73
  - average rank 61 52 61 65 68
  - above average rank 73 74 77 79 81
The ratio between per capita total expenditures 
on net transfer basis of CRJs and consolidated 
regional government (%)
8.75                   
(0.01)
0.27                  
(0.89)
  - below average rank 59 54 57 59 59
  - average rank 64 61 61 62 62
  - above average rank 73 75 78 76 74
Net regional transfers as percent of CRJs total 
expenditures on net transfer basis (%)
3.84                   
(0.08)
0.74                  
(0.57)
  - below average rank 24 25 29 22 25
  - average rank 15 15 19 16 15
  - above average rank 11 9 11 8 11
Real per capita CRJs revenues from shared 
taxes (1990 Rubles)
4.15                   
(0.07)
23.12                 
(0.00)
  - below average rank 213 220 186 115 105
  - average rank 388 301 191 163 174
  - above average rank 384 384 302 206 198
Real per capita CRJs revenues from own taxes 
(1990 Rubles)
12.72                  
(0.01)
46.91                 
(0.00)
  - below average rank 25 39 62 44 80
  - average rank 40 58 115 102 163
  - above average rank 36 67 95 69 121
Real per capita CRJs budget expenditures on 
Health and Sports (1990 Rubles)
4.65                   
(0.05)
24.53                 
(0.00)
  - below average rank 65 72 59 38 46
  - average rank 83 113 97 75 91
  - above average rank 82 105 83 52 62
Real per capita CRJs budget expenditures on 
National Economy (1990 Rubles)
2.94                   
(0.12)
4.63                  
(0.01)
  - below average rank 131 139 143 105 102
  - average rank 201 185 137 142 175
  - above average rank 193 232 202 138 157
Real per capita monthly income in region 
(1990 Rubles)
6.31                   
(0.03)
14.7                  
(0.00)
  - below average rank 116 132 134 106 120
  - average rank 124 151 152 130 143
  - above average rank 150 172 166 138 158
Life expectancy in region (years) 3.59                   
(0.08)
145.5                 
(0.00)
  - below average rank 69 67 66 66 67
  - average rank 69 67 66 66 67
  - above average rank 68 65 64 65 66
1995 1996
F-statistics in Repeated Measures ANOVA
Indicators / Year 1992 1993 1994 Differences in Rate of 
Change of Group Means 
Across Time- 71 - 







 Old       
( > 4 years)
New       
( < 4 years)
Large     
(  >= 20 
Employees) 
Small      







1. Profitability in 1997 (% of firms 
reporting large positive profits minus 
% of firms reporting negative profits)
-20 -27 -8 -27 -14 -14 -32 -25 -15 100 0 -100
2. Change in employment, 1997-98 (% of 
firms reporting increase in employment 
minus % of firms reporting decrease in 
employment)
-31 -11 -46 -59 -6 -36 -21 0 -60 0 -30 -44
3. Change in productivity, 1997-98 (% of 
firms reporting increase in productivity 
minus % of firms reporting decrease in 
productivity)
-19 -15 -18 -26 -13 -18 -21 -25 -13 14 -20 -33
4. Average monthly wage of an entry-
level production worker or sales clerk, 
end of 1997 ( '000 roubles)
383 327 437 381 385 377 397 332 431 461 384 341
5. Wage arrears (% of firms in arrears) 33 52 11 38 29 36 28 52 17 29 27 53
6. Wage arrears (duration in months) 3.1 3.2 3.0 3.4 2.7 2.6 4.2 3.0 3.2 2.5 3.3 3.0
7. Investment as percent of gross 
revenues minus expenditures on inputs, 
utilities and rent
9 8 12 3 15 9 9 3 16 20 9 6
II. Taxation, government policy and 
attitude
1. Tax payments as percent of gross 
revenues minus expenditures on inputs, 
utilities and rent
67 65 66 71 63 65 72 73 60 43 69 72
2. Total number of taxes paid 14 13 14 14 13 14 13 14 13 18 13 13
3. Under licensing regime (% of firms) 88 81 93 81 94 85 95 79 97 71 90 89
4. Difficulty of obtaining a license for 
trade (% of firms that answered 
"difficult")
14 27 4 14 14 9 22 23 7 40 7 19
5. Price controls (number of firms 
affected)
23 13 8 12 11 14 9 14 9 2 9 12
6. Price controls in production (number 
of firms affected)
11 10 0 5 6 6 5 9 2 1 3 7
7. Limit on retail markup (number of 
firms affected)
71 6 4 3 43 3 4 0 5 2
8. Local government inefficiency  
(number of firms that ranked the 
problem as 1st or 2nd in importance)
25 11 14 7 18 15 10 8 17 4 16 4
9. Corruption  (number of firms that 
ranked the problem as 1st or 2nd in 
importance)
31 15 15 13 18 20 11 15 16 5 13 11
10. City government  (% of respondents 
rating the attitude of city government 
as "positive" minus % of respondents 
rating  the attitude as "negative")
36 17 50 45 29 41 26 17 52 29 41 19
11. Regional government (% of 
respondents rating the attitude of 
regional government as "positive" 
minus % of respondents rating  the 
attitude as "negative")
23 21 22 33 18 22 25 11 32 -17 30 27
Size of Firm Firm's Profits in 1997
Negative
Past Ownership
Total Questions / Grouping Variables
Type of Firm Years Private- 72 - 






 Old       
( > 4 years)
New       
( < 4 years)
Large     
(  >= 20 
Employees) 
Small      







1. Existence of business center (number 
of firms answered affirmatively) 35 16 17 14 21 24 11 17 18 4 19 11
2. Number of firms that have used the 
business center
84 3 4 4 62 3 5 0 4 4
3. Number of firms that found the 
services of the business center useful
42 1 2 2 31 3 1 0 3 1
4. Number of firms that claim that local 
governments have not helped their 
businesses at all
24 12 12 6 18 12 12 7 17 6 9 8
5. How can local governments help your 
business (numnber of firms that 
selected the option)
  - Leasing or finding production/retail 
rrr space 31 14 16 6 25 17 14 12 19 5 17 8
  - Help to get credit 38 21 14 22 16 28 10 22 16 3 20 15
  - Registration 93 5 2 7 45 4 5 0 6 3
  - Help in finding suppliers/consumers 16 10 6 8 8 10 6 10 6 2 5 9
  - Help in contacts with upper levels    
rrr of government 11 4 6 4 7 6 5 6 5 2 5 4
  - Legal advice and help 16 7 7 7 9 11 5 5 11 1 6 8
  - By not interfering 22 8 13 6 16 12 10 6 16 3 8 9
IV. Municipal services and utilities (% of 
respondents rating the quality of 
service as "good" minus % of 
respondents rating the quality of 
i) 1. Public transport 22 22 25 32 12 22 22 26 19 20 23 13
2. Water and sewage 11 4 19 12 10 11 11 22 0 0 7 17
3. Electricity 40 31 50 35 45 34 53 15 63 29 41 33
4. Telecommunications 25 23 30 38 13 34 6 15 34 0 14 39
5. Garbage collection 7 0 19 27 -10 14 -6 19 -3 17 14 -11
6. Street repairs/lightening/cleaning -59 -70 -46 -37 -77 -62 -53 -54 -63 -57 -60 -56
7. Public safety and property protection -60 -64 -59 -60 -59 -62 -56 -67 -54 -100 -68 -38
8. Legal settlement -27 -35 -20 -26 -27 -25 -29 -37 -18 -33 -38 0
V. Business services  (% of respondents 
rating the quality of service as "good" 
minus % of respondents rating the 
quality of service as "poor")
1. Banking 35 17 46 29 39 25 53 36 33 29 54 0
2. Insurance -16 -42 0 -7 -22 -14 -18 -36 -5 -80 -11 -14
3. Advertizing 50 48 56 64 39 50 50 48 52 33 56 43
4. Delivery of goods 36 43 38 50 29 29 47 33 37 0 44 36
VI. Business Environment
1. Trust between business partners  (% of 
respondents rating the trust between 
business partners as "good" minus % 
of respondents rating it as "poor")
24 8 38 25 23 22 28 20 27 43 31 6
2. Crime  (number of firms that ranked 
the problem as 1st or 2nd in 
importance)
11 4 6 6 5 8 3 4 7 2 5 2
Size of Firm Firm's Profits in 1997
Negative
Questions / Grouping Variables Total
Type of Firm Past Ownership Years Private
3. "Krisha"  (number of firms that ranked 
the problem as 1st or 2nd in 
importance)
42 2 1 3 04 1 3 0 3 1
4. Number of firms that paid for 
protection in 1997
61 5 1 5 42 4 2 0 6 0
5. Citizens (% of respondents rating the 
attitude of citizens as "positive" minus 
% of respondents rating  the attitude as 
"negative")
25 17 31 52 4 18 39 8 42 -20 14 53- 73 - 
Appendix Table 8. Survey Responses by City 
 
Kazan Ulyanovsk Samara Saratov Volgograd Astrakhan
I. Firms' characteristics
1. Number of firms 10 9 10 10 10 9 58
2. Position of person interviewed (% owners) 80 78 60 50 20 33 53
3. Past ownership (% privatized state firms) 40 11 60 0 90 78 47
4. Main activity (% engaged in production) 40 33 50 50 50 56 47
5. Average period under private ownership (years) 35 5 355 4
6. Average number of employees in 1998 21 20 26 21 122 48 43
II. Firms' performance
1. Profitability (% of firms reporting large positive 
profits minus % of firms reporting negative profits)
-56 0 -30 10 -22 -22 -20
2. Change in employment, 1997-1998  (% of firms 
reporting increase in employment minus % of firms 
reporting decrease in employment)
-70 -22 -70 30 -10 -44 -31
3. Change in productivity (% of firms reporting 
increase in productivity minus % of firms reporting 
decrease in productivity)
-10 22 10 -60 -20 -56 -19
4.
Average monthly wage of an entry-level production 
worker or sales clerk, end 1997 ( '000 roubles)
550 428 355 268 375 339 383
5. Wage arrears (% of firms in arrears) 20 22 40 50 44 22 33
6. Wage arrears (duration in months) 2.5 2.5 4.8 2.4 3.0 2.5 3.1
7. Investment as percent of gross revenues minus 
expenditures on inputs, utilities and rent
13 24 16 3 1 0 9
8. Number of firms that paid for protection in 1997 14 1 000 6
III. Taxation, government policy and attitude
1. Tax payments as percent of gross revenues minus 
expenditures on inputs, utilities and rent
71 55 60 75 69 74 67
2. Total number of taxes paid 18 9 11 10 15 16 14
3. Under licensing regime (% of firms) 1 0 08 9 1 0 0 1 0 08 05 6 8 8
4. Difficulty of obtaining a license for trade (% of 
firms that answered "difficult")
30 0 10 20 13 0 14
5. Price controls (number of firms affected) 51 6 056 2 3
6. Price controls in production (number of firms 
affected)
30 3 14 1 1
7. Limit on retail markup (number of firms affected) 10 2 22 7
8. Local government inefficiency  (number of firms 
that ranked the problem as 1st or 2nd in 
importance)
46 3 921 2 5
9. Corruption  (number of firms that ranked the 
problem as 1st or 2nd in importance)
65 2 549 3 1
10. City government  (% of respondents rating the 
attitude of city government as "positive" minus % of 
respondents rating  the attitude as "negative")
40 25 50 20 67 22 36
11. Regional government (% of respondents rating the 
attitude of regional government as "positive" minus 
% of respondents rating  the attitude as "negative")
50 -57 44 22 50 25 23
Questions / Grouping Variable Total- 74 - 
(Appendix Table 8 continued) 
Kazan Ulyanovsk Samara Saratov Volgograd Astrakhan
IV. Business Center
1. Existence of business center (number of firms 
answered affirmatively)
5 869 5 2 3 5
2.
Number of firms that have used the business center
3 120 2 08
3. Number of firms that found the services of the 
business center useful
20 1 1 4
4. Number of firms that claim that local governments 
have not helped their businesses at all
63 2 1 012 2 4
5. How can local governments help your business 
(numnber of firms that selected the option)
  - Leasing or finding production/retail space 6 869 2 0 3 1
  - Help to get credit 6 376 7 9 3 8
  - Registration 4 221 0 09
  - Help in finding suppliers/consumers 2 350 4 2 1 6
  - Help in contacts with upper levels of government
3 412 1 0 1 1
  - Legal advice and help 5 440 2 1 1 6
  - By not interfering 8 355 1 0 2 2
V. Municipal services and utilities (% of respondents 
rating the quality of service as "good" minus % of 
respondents rating the quality of service as "poor")
1. Public transport 0 -43 67 20 56 13 22
2. Water and sewage 0 0 0 0 50 11 11
3. Electricity 44 11 60 60 80 -22 40
4. Telecommunications 50 33 30 -50 80 11 25
5. Garbage collection 0 -13 20 -20 70 -22 7
6. Street repairs/lightening/cleaning -30 -89 -30 -90 -50 -67 -59
7. Public safety and property protection -33 -71 -80 -60 -50 -63 -60
8. Legal settlement -10 -60 -60 -33 0 -17 -27
VI. Business services  (% of respondents rating the 
quality of service as "good" minus % of respondents 
rating the quality of service as "poor")
1. Banking 50 11 30 60 57 0 35
2. Insurance 0 0 -29 -75 20 -20 -16
3. Advertizing 20 22 90 44 100 0 50
4. Delivery of goods 33 14 43 20 100 0 36
VII. Business Environment
1.
Trust between business partners  (% of respondents 
rating the trust between business partners as "good" 
minus % of respondents rating it as "poor")
30 33 40 -20 13 50 24
2. Crime (number of firms that ranked the problem as 
1st or 2nd in importance)
1 252 1 0 1 1
3. "Krisha"  (number of firms that ranked the problem 
as 1st or 2nd in importance)
1 021 0 04
4. Citizens (% of respondents rating the attitude of 
citizens as "positive" minus % of respondents rating  
the attitude as "negative")
71 0 60 -60 56 33 25
Questions / Grouping Variable Total